Good Points! On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 12:16 AM, Michael Allan <[email protected]> wrote:
> > The psychological value of this method is that it appeals to our > > natural community spirit which includes a willingness to go along > > with the group consensus when the consensus is strong enough, as > > long as there is no hope for a better consensus, and as long as it > > isn't a candidate that we would rate at zero. > > > > Comments? > > I think there is a general williness to *consider* a consensus, but > not a general willingness to follow it blindly. The popularity of a > candidate is a recommendation to look more closely at that candidate > given the fact of his/her popularity. Here popularity directly serves > only to arouse my curiosity, "Why is this candidate more popular? > What do others know that I don't know?" > > On learning the answer, I decide whether to follow the consensus. > > The proposed method differs in asking me to make the same decision, > but without knowing the reason for the candidate's popularity. It > invites me to act irrationally and enshrines that action as normal > human behaviour. > > As a counter-proposal, consider a broader rationalization of the > electoral design. Rather than overloading a single election with > expectations it cannot fulfil, factor it into two elections: (1) a > continuous, advisory primary to flush out consensus and dissensus, to > give people time to talk things over, and decide what to do; followed > by (2) a decisive election in which they express the decision. This > solves the problem of systematic irrationality by allowing for a real > consensus in the primary, one with reasons behind it, the validity of > which can be discussed and debated before making a decision. > > -- > Michael Allan > > Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 > http://zelea.com/ > > > Forest Simmons said: > > Jobst has suggested that ballots be used to elicit voter's "consensus > > thresholds" for the various candidates. > > > > If your consensus threshold for candidate X is 80 percent, that means > that > > you would be willing to support candidate X if more than 80 percent of > the > > other voters were also willing to support candidate X, but would forbid > > your vote from counting towards the election of X if the total support > for > > X would end up short of 80 percent. > > > > The higher the threshold that you give to X the more reluctant you are to > > join in a consensus, but as long as your threshold t for X is less than > > than 100 percent, a sufficiently large consensus (i.e. larger than t > > percent) would garner your support, as long as it it is the largest > > consensus that qualifies for your support. > > > > A threshold of zero signifies that you are willing to support X no matter > > how small the consensus, as long as no larger consensus qualifies for > your > > support. > > > > I suggest that we use score ballots on a scale of 0 to 100 with the > > convention that the score and the threshold for a candidate are related > by > > s+t=100. > > > > So given the score ballots, here's how the method is counted: > > > > For each candidate X let p(X) be the largest number p between 0 and 100 > > such that p(X) ballots award a score strictly greater than 100-p to > > candidate X. > > > > The candidate X with the largest value of p(X) wins the election. > > > > If there are two or more candidates that share this maximum value of p, > > then choose from the tied set the candidate ranked the highest in the > > following order: > > > > Candidate X precedes candidate Y if X is scored above zero on more > ballots > > than Y. If this doesn't break the tie, then X precedes Y if X is scored > > above one on more ballots than Y. If that still doesn't break the tie, > > then X precedes Y if X is scored above two on more ballots than Y, etc. > > > > In the unlikely event that the tie isn't broken before you get to 100, > > choose the winner from the remaining tied candidates by random ballot. > > > > The psychological value of this method is that it appeals to our natural > > community spirit which includes a willingness to go along with the group > > consensus when the consensus is strong enough, as long as there is no > hope > > for a better consensus, and as long as it isn't a candidate that we would > > rate at zero. > > > > Comments? > > > > Forest >
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