At 03:09 PM 5/30/2013, David L Wetzell wrote:
* LR Hare has one vote per voter and one candidate per party and one
or two vice-candidates on the party-list who win the extra seats if
a party's candidate wins multiple seats. But the top candidate
would have to beat the third place candidate by more than one-third
of the vote to win two seats and (s)he'd have to beat the 2nd place
candidate by more than two-thirds of the vote to win all three
seats. So if the vote %s were 40:30:20:10 then there'd be 3
winners. If they were 50:35:10:5 then the top candidate would win
two seats and her/his vice-candidate would hold the second seat. If
they were 80:10:5:5 then the top candidate would win all three seats
and get to choose two vice-candidates (or have her/his list
specified before the election) but that outcome is not likely
outside of Russia or other DINO areas.
Party-list PR is interesting, and STV is a very fair system for
handling it. I'm not going to get into "best system" yet. If we are
looking at a practical possibility in the U.S., we will need to
answer that question. There is no sunk cost, so to speak.
Asset Voting was originally a tweak on STV. Most voters only know
their favorite. I find it interesting that David assumes that an
asset-like condition is possible, either by free choice of the
candidate, or by a predetermined list. In the long run, I find the
former to be the deepest reform because it can take us *beyond* the
party system to something that can shade into direct/representative
democracy, a profound transformation.
Possible in NGOs, immediately.
Now, the quota. It's clear that the Hare quota creates proportionally
fair winners, generally the first two. What about that third seat?
The Droop quota gives more voting power to the winners of the first
two seats, effectively. It treats all seats equally.
The Hare quota gives minority representation better. In a two-party
system, the Hare quota is more likely to elect a minority party
candidate. It does not go too far in this. That candidate *will* be
elected with fewer "assigned voters," by definition.
In the Asset systems I've proposed, I've used the Hare quota, and
*tolerate* the possible unfilled seat. I'd allow the unrepresented
votes to be cast *directly* on Assembly issues. These are public
voters, those votes could be cast over the internet without the
security issues we associate with internet voting. (All votes would
be public.) So the function of a *seat*, then, is representation in
deliberation: in introducing motions, and in debating on the floor,
this can be distinguished from amalgamation, actual choice.
However short of that, Hare will accomplish this goal better than
Droop: a goal that the number of citizens who are represented in the
Assembly be maximized. Hare will produce a *slight* bias toward
minority representation over Droop. That's not going to give away the
assembly to a minority party, just give them a voice.
Obviously, using larger districts will enhance this. But what about
the desire of local representation? That can happen spontaneously.
Under full Asset, people will very likely tend, most of them, to vote
for someone local, and because full Asset does not waste votes, it's
totally safe to vote without any restriction as to "electability."
I know that I'd prefer a representative in an Assembly who lives
relatively far from me, but who represents me more accurately, to one
who is close but with whom I cannot communicate well. After all,
there is the telephone and email and, even, snailmail.
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