Let's just drop this. You're technically wrong but substantially right, and I don't see what's to be gained by convincing you of that that's worth the time I think it would take.
As to the name thing, you called me "James". No big deal, really. I made the "Joe" joke, then you didn't realize what I was talking about and implied I was serious. Misunderstanding. Cheers, Jameson 2013/6/7 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[email protected]> > At 10:51 AM 6/7/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> I'm sorry, I don't want to get into an interminable back and forth with >> someone who misuses my name and doesn't apologize, and prefers "you didn't >> prove it!" to working anything out for themselves or asking nicely for >> evidence. >> > > Jameson, I responded substantially and in detail to your claim of FBC > failure. You are not obligated to respond to anything. You showed nothing, > not even a weak evidence, beyond the name "turkey-raising," just a claim. > And if you are content with that, that's your privilege. > > For me, and so far, unless someone comes up with a plausible scenario, it > stands as demonstrated that a claim of FBC failure for top-two runoff, > based on a "turkey-raising" strategy, is meaningless. Turkey-raising, under > Approval/runoff, does not establish FBC failure, because one could still > vote for the Favorite without harming the strategy. > > As we will see more proposed usage of approval and approval methods with > runoff voting, it's an important issue. > > Who misused your name? What are you talking about? What is to apologize > for? It's "not nice" to point out that a point has not been supported? What? > > (no more original content below.) > > > JamesON >> >> 2013/6/7 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <<mailto:[email protected]>a** >> [email protected] <[email protected]>> >> >> At 06:28 PM 6/6/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote: >> >> 2013/6/6 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <<mailto:[email protected]>a** >> [email protected] <[email protected]>> >> Subject was: Re: [EM] Someone thinks that Approval should meet the Mutual >> Majority Criterion >> >> James does not help us out with a description of why it fails. >> >> Should I start calling you Joe now? :) >> >> >> You may join any club that will admit you. Ask Michael. >> >> >> Others have said how it fails: through a turkey-raising strategy. >> Implausible, unlikely, as you may have it; but still clearly possible. >> >> >> Actually, that was not said recently. It's not only implausible, it does >> not appear to violate FBC. That is why I have asked for specifics. >> >> Favorite Betrayal Criterion: >> >> Wikipedia: >> >> A >> <<http://en.wikipedia.org/**wiki/Voting_system<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system> >> >http://en.**wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_**system<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system>>voting >> system satisfies the Favorite Betrayal Criterion (FBC) if there do not >> exist situations where a voter is only able to obtain a more preferred >> outcome (i.e. the election of a candidate that he or she prefers to the >> current winner) by insincerely listing another candidate ahead of his or >> her sincere favorite.<<http://en.**wikipedia.org/wiki/Favorite_** >> betrayal_criterion#cite_note-1<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Favorite_betrayal_criterion#cite_note-1> >> **>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/**Favorite_betrayal_criterion#** >> cite_note-1<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Favorite_betrayal_criterion#cite_note-1>>[1] >> >> >> >> Scorevoting.net (article by Ossipoff and Smith): >> >> Voters should have no incentive to vote someone else over their favorite. >> >> >> After my usual carping about absolute standards like "no incentive" -- >> Space Aliens can provide strong incentives -- I don't see how a >> turkey-raising strategy with an Approval primary involves betrayal of the >> Favorite. It does involve "betrayal" of a lower preference. >> >> I.e., primary unconditionally feeds top two to runoff, which is >> vote-for-one. I.e., this is the Arizona system, without the Approval >> feature. >> >> Voter prefers A>B>C. Voter fears that if runoff is A vs. B, B could win, >> so votes for C. This voter is going to wet his or her pants if C leads, >> but, never mind, maybe in the runoff A will win, because these turkey >> farmers are not going to vote for C in the runff. >> >> But, now suppose this is an Approval primary, i.e, this is in Arizona and >> it's a municipality that's implemented the system. >> >> Never mind that turkey raising is something that turkey farmers in >> Arizona would never admit to. Out in the Arizona desert, folks get along, >> and are straightforward and honest with each other. But, just suppose they >> try this. >> >> Okay, how does it show up? They could vote for C, hoping to push B out of >> the runoff. They actually can't do that, because of write-ins, which are >> allowed, but, hey, they can dream, they could even dream of Space Aliens >> telling them to vote this way. In fact, given that this is Arizona, that's >> fairly plausible. Something about the cloud formations. No, wait, that's >> New Mexico. >> >> But a little detail about FBC. Sure, they could vote for C, but if what >> they want is for A to win, which is the whole motivation for running this >> devious plan, why don't they also vote for A? They are pushing for B to be >> excluded, and, this way, they push with two candidates (or more). >> >> from the Smith-Ossipoff page: >> >> one can prove FBC-compliance by the following strategy: If betraying >> favorite F in order to make X win is the plan, and if that plan actually >> works, then the alternate non-betrayal plan of simply raising X to be >> co-equal top with F (carried out by the same set of voters who planned to >> betray F, using the same set of votes they planned on) also works to make X >> win. Q.E.D. >> >> >> There is no incentive to vote C above A, the favorite. Want to raise the >> turkey, C, to exclude B? Fine. Also vote for A. No Betrayal. >> >> Indeed, this is part of a more sophisticated system of utilities. A voter >> who votes A,C is *actually preferring to see a runoff between A and C* over >> B winning. They may *say* that they prefer B>C, we might speculate this >> about them, but the Space Alien in their head has convinced them to vote >> otherwise, and we don't know that there is anything in there except Space >> Aliens. >> >> If they think they need to bullet vote for C, they are not merely raising >> turkeys, they *are* turkeys. That should be part of FBC: the voters must >> not be turkeys. (Actually, it is, just not stated that way. There is some >> debate about complex strategies, blah, blah. It's moot here, unless someone >> wants to assert such a strategy.) >> >> Turkey raising strategy is FBC violating in non-approval top two runoff, >> but is risky there. Essentially, the faction that decides to do it must not >> be large enough to whack A by voting for C. It would, therefore, take >> collusion to be reasonably safe, and it would, therefore, risk losing A >> supporters. (Does A tolerate this? B just might start getting a lot more >> votes, and A might have trouble remaining in the top two. And if we really >> want to study this, we'd need to start looking at underlying utilities. And >> here we can start to recognize how blanket judgement of voting systems by >> simplified criteria can be a hazardous business, which was my original >> point on the CES list.) >> >> >> Further, "failure is minor" is an issue when using voting systems >> criteria to study voting systems. That's the problem with using the >> criteria as absolutes. >> >> Yes, it's an issue. Absolutely. The difference between failing badly and >> barely failing, is often larger than the difference between barely failing >> and passing. But that doesn't mean you shouldn't be clear about the >> difference. >> >> >> Of course we should be clear. If a system *technically* violates a >> criterion, but does not substantially do so, we should say exactly that. We >> would never say that it does not violate the criterion. However, here, an >> approval primary does not appear to violate the criterion. The "betrayal" >> is of a lower preference, not the Favorite. >> >> >> I did not give examples because I'm not asserting failure. Someone who is >> asserting it, I'd prefer that they at least show an example. It would be >> generous to cover the underlying utilities motivating the behavior, but >> I'll do that if the writer doesn't. (Or will infer them and might show that >> they do not significantly motivate the behavior, as a rough and nonspecific >> analysis is telling me.) >> >> 2. Top two approval where a candidate with a majority can win, otherwise >> two candidates advance. >> >> Still fails, although it's slightly better. >> >> From what point of view? *How* is it better? *How much* better? >> >> If any candidate has a majority, there is no FBC failure. If not, you >> have system 1, which can fail FBC as explained above. Since that is only >> part of the time, it is only partly as bad. >> >> >> Once again, it appears to me that Jameson is asserting this because he >> has not looked at an actual example, but is running off steam from *other >> situations.* There was no "explanation above." There is now. If it's not >> what Jameson had in mind, he's completely welcome to supply the scenario >> and explanation. For reference, here is "system 1", as defined by me and >> quoted by Jameson: >> >> >> 1. Top two approval where two candidates advance to the general election. >> >> This fails FBC. >> >> >> QNED, quod non erat demonstrandum, this is not demonstrated. >> >> >> 3. If write-in votes are allowed in the runoff, the primary is actually a >> nomination device, not the actual election. The actual election being >> Approval, the combination must satisfy FBC if Approval does, and it does. >> >> This is true... but only if there's a hard threshold for making it to the >> second round. That is, "all candidates with over 1/3 approval advance", or >> some such; and if there are fewer than 2 such candidates, the highest >> approval wins in the first round. >> >> No. Threshold has nothing to do with it. If the primary is only a >> nomination device, it is like petition requirements or partisan primaries. >> Understand that this is like the Arizona proposal, but with Approval in the >> final election. If the final election is Approval, Approval satisfies FBC, >> because the voters may still vote for their Favorite in the general >> election. There is no cost to that, and by the rule that a method satisfies >> FBC if there is a simple way for the voter to actually vote for their >> Favorite and not betray the Favorite by voting for someone else *over* the >> Favorite, and gain as good an expected result, then FBC is satisfied. >> >> If the primary is not considered as part of the election process, then >> sure, it could consist of shooting any candidate with an even number of >> votes, and it would not cause FBC failure. >> >> >> "Election process" reasonably includes any process prior to a >> deterministic poll. The primary is, then, "part of the election process," >> but is not the deterministic poll. We do not state that a voting system >> fails a criterion merely because of voting system details that still allow >> the test of the criterion. As an example, I have often claimed that >> repeated ballot, no eliminations, majority required to complete, satisfies >> the Condorcet criterion. This obviously must apply to the final poll, not >> to prior ones, because voters can and will shift their preferences, new >> candidates may be nominated, etc. It would apply to any *persistent* >> preferences, if expressed consistently. The definitive test is in the final >> poll. >> >> >> But if you are considering it as part of the election, you can't just >> make it up as you go along. A hard threshold, or a threshold based on a >> mathematical function of the top candidate's votes alone, causes no FBC >> failure. A set number of candidates advancing causes FBC failure, though >> not a particularly serious one. >> >> >> QNED. >> >> >> (If write-in votes are allowed, in this concept, the runoff must also be >> Approval.) >> >> Arizona had a method up for legislative passage that would have allowed >> municipalities to use a two-stage voting system with an Approval primary, >> top-two advancing to the general election with ballot placement, and, >> apparently, write-ins allowed in the general election (as well as in the >> primary). The primary has no majority test, it is top-two plurality, but >> voters may vote for as many candidates as they choose. The runoff is >> standard vote-for-one. >> >> So, first of all, does this method fail FBC? If so, is the scenario >> plausible for real voters? These are nonpartisan elections. >> >> I'm not seeing any actual analysis here, just authoritarian statements. >> >> So? Right and wrong are not decided by word counts or votes. >> >> >> Well, ontologically, "right" and "wrong" are only words, meaningless >> outside of definitions, not absolutes, but rather stands, judgements, >> opinions, models, etc., that are either useful or not. And this, too, is a >> stand. >> >> "Authoritarian" might be thought of as "bad." Not if one is an authority >> and is careful! Helpful authorities will explain the foundations of their >> knowledge.... and if they overlook this, they will surely provide it, when >> asked, if practical. >> >> >
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