At 06:24 PM 6/12/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Uh, Score systems can ba amagalamated as median or as average or as sum.
This isn't the misunderstanding I was talking about, but by saying
"Score" with a capital "S" I was referring to a summed or averaged system.
The latter fits most closely with democratic traditions, it is just
Count all the votes, i.e., Approval, plus the allowance of fractional voting.
Median systems are introducing what appears to be, for public
choice, an *entirely new* concept. So, the obvious question, why?
???? You are the one who likes Bucklin. Bucklin is a median system
that's nearly 100 years old. How is that "*entirely new*" ????
You can conceptualize Bucklin as a median system, because the first
candidate to pass the majority post has the highest median vote.
However, that's not how Bucklin was understood. It was seeking a
majority, that's all. Explaining "median," and, particlarly,
"graduated median," is a bit of a chore, as we have seen.
This is something that is missing from many voting systems that have
been designed with non-inutitive amalgamation process. I can read a
description of how to amalgamate, but what I want to know, and I
suspect most people will want to know, is the *sense* behind the system.
And, remember, we are talking about first reforms, not the *ideal*.
But median systems have a problem. There are too many of them, and
even more names.
Off the top of my head, I can think of the following names:
* Bucklin: A general class of median systems which are
implemented via a descending threshold. Also used to describe
various specific ranked or hybrid ranked/rated systems used during
the progressive era. For instance, some use "Bucklin" to mean
"median using full or truncated rankings, using the highest
majority as a tiebreaker"; others mean the Grand Junction system of
"median using 3+1 numbered rank/grades with skipping allowed and
ties allowed at the third grade only; highest majority tiebreaker".
Bucklin is a median system, that's true, but that is not the *concept.*
I don't even know what that means. In my book, making a distinction
between median systems on one hand and Bucklin systems on the other
is unsustainable. Any Bucklin system is a median system; and if you
want to define things so that there is a median system that isn't a
Bucklin system, that's a distinction without a difference.
Bucklin is a "median system," but only because "majority" *fits* with
the median concept. That is, *majority approval.*
Bucklin only allowed approval votes, and that they were ranked was a
refinement. I remember when we started discussing approval, and the
common tope that approval voting had never been used in the U.S. It
was repeated over and over. But Bucklin is a form of approval voting,
and in many, probably most, elections, collapsed to straight
approval, unlimited number of candidates may be approved.
It is the *obvious* next step beyond Approval. In a few places, it's
possible that a system will go directly from Plurality to Bucklin.
And any poor performance of Bucklin would come, quite likely, from
using median amalgamation. (I.e., a Bucklin ballot is really a Score
ballot, and a score ballot can be used for Bucklin amalgamation, it
is an obvious and simple extension.)
I literally cannot parse this at all.
It's obvious, Jameson. The first sentence and the parenthetical
comment are separate. Notice: I was here acknowledging, specifically,
that Bucklin uses a kind of median amalgamation. Since the ballot
*could be* the same as a Score ballot, the only difference being an
explicit approval cutoff, what I consider a necessary tweak to Score
(it can be handled simply by defining 50% Score as the approval
cutoff, i.e., 50% or higher is "approved") then "poor performance,"
now meaning increased Bayesian Regret, would come from the
amalgamation difference, "quite likely."
I do expect that the vast majority of Bucklin voters will vote
sincerely, and real-world breakdowns will come from bullet voting,
which is *unavoidable without requiring full ranking.* The
"breakdown" simply means that a majority is not found. And that's
*easy* to fix, and people all over the planet know how to fix it.
It's called a "runoff." However, with the Arizona initiative, we have
started looking at mandatory two-round systems, with the primary
being a "special election," and the "runoff" being the general
election. The primary then becomes a feeder to the general election,
a nominating device.
I assume you understand that a score ballot can be used for Bucklin
amalgamation, as you use a score ballot for median amalgamation.
So the "poor performance" would come from variation in utility sum
caused by using the median rather than the mean. This is quite well
known; i.e, "majority rule" is not utility-sum optimal. However, this
is something that actually transcends utility sum: majority consent.
An alleged utility-maximizing result, if majority consent is not
present, is *minority rule.*
There are two solutions to this problem: a ratification or specific
choice vote, now informed by the score poll, or a prior rule, with
ongoing acceptance by the majority, to accept such "non-majority"
results. We tend, in general, on matters like this, to go for "prior
rule," wherein the past rules the future. It's certainly possible,
then, because we do it all the time. But it's also limiting.
In the case of election results, standard deliberative process (which
is a standard by which I generally judge voting systems as to
accuracy of simulation of such process) *never* accepts a plurality
result. Any motion or action without the explicit acceptance of a
majority *fails*. It is as if it didn't exist, but, of course, the
voting members have observed it and the process, and may then color
their future actions accordingly.
Deliberative process is *interactive* and *intelligent.* It also
takes time, that's the down side. It's always a trade-off as to
whether or not a process is worth pursuing.
* Majority Choice Approval (MCA): I've seen this applied to
various 3-rank median systems, but I think the canonical one is:
"if there is a majority top-rank, then the highest such; otherwise,
the candidate with the most non-bottom rankings."
* Majority Judgment (MJ): as defined by Balinski and Laraki
* Graduated Majority Judgment (GMJ): as defined by me.
There are also a number of possible descriptive "branding" terms for
a median / Bucklin system:
* Instant Runoff Approval
I created that one, because that is exactly what it is, and it
simulates a series of descending cutoff Approval elections, hence a
way-cool implementation, as a primary and runoff method in a
two-round system, thus, if it has N approval grades, it simulates
2*N approval runoffs in the full two-election set. Jurisdictions
that want to ensure majority approval can probably reach that, even
with many candidates, in a two-round Bucklin system, and I've
suggested that if the Range ballot is a little deeper, i.e, includes
unapproved ranks, it can also, in the primary, be analysed for a
beats-Range top two (or beats-Bucklin top two) winner, using the
lower preferences, thus making the *system* Condorcet compliant, if
a Condorcet winner must always be in the runoff. If a majority is
found, depending on the wishes of the jurisdiction, the runoff may
not be necessary.
Increasingly, though, I've become aware of systems that *always* go
to the general election. So the primary is just a unified primary,
as distinct from party primaries. And with a good runoff method, and
with write-ins allowed in the runoff, the electorate can still have
three choices on the ballot, if certain conditions are met, plus
write-ins that don't necessarily vote-split.
What, I'd like to know, is not to like about this?
Runoff systems are great, and the intelligent runoffs you often
propose are great. They're also not what we're talking about. Are
you saying that the term "instant runoff approval" is a bad one
because the system can be used in combination with a runoff?
Eh? Where would you get that? "Instant runoff approval" is a *great
name.* However, I did turn to something else: a primary election as a
nominating device, feeding as many as three candidates to the
*general election*, which is no longer a "runoff." It's the election.
Notice the primary complaint about runoffs: low participation. Now, I
have often pointed out that this may be complaining about a
*feature*, because low-turnout does not equal low-performance. There
is a general *assumption* that high participation is a sign of
"improved democracy." It's not necessarily so, as to special
elections. However, *this is a popular idea,* and a general election
has the advantage of convenience for voters.
As I've pointed out, that "convenience" has a cost: a less-informed
electorate. My overall goal as to the political system would be
*consensual delegation,* where voters create and delegate voting
power to trusted individuals, who presumably become, with increased
voting power, more informed. Hey, if you could *actually choose* your
member of Congress, to represent you (and others who have trusted
you), wouldn't you make sure to *meet* the possible candidates? And I
don't mean a photo-op session where you smile like old friends when
you really know almost nothing about each other.
"Actually choose." I.e., have enough voting power to clearly *make
the difference* as to the election of a seat.
The *entire concept* of single-winner elections to office for a fixed
term has a fundamental, unavoidable problem. It's the past binding the present.
But we proceed toward transformed systems one step at a time. It's
hard to walk without taking steps, and running without steps will
leave you face-down on the floor with a broken nose.
* Graded Instant Runoff
* Descending Threshold Approval
* Majority Threshold
* Grade Voting
* Majority-Based Grade Assignment
Instant runoff Approval fully satisfies expectations. It is what the
name implies.
... But now you're saying that Instant Runoff Approval is a good
term? I don't understand your larger point.
Start with "good" and "bad" not being in my vocabulary other than as
banter. Like "Bad Idea." Nothing I'd written above implied that there
was anything wrong with the term.
This is important for "instant runoff approval." The system must find
a majority winner or *fail*, in which case there is a *real runoff.*
But a nomination system for Bucklin was actually used, in the last
Bucklin implementations. As primary elections, they were just
choosing a party candidate, so they were nonpartisan elections. And
they experienced majority failure, often, apparently. However, that
was *not* necessarily poor performance, but whenever such an election
produced a result disliked by some powerful interest group, they
would use it against the system, and the public has often tolerated
severe manipulation around this. Majority failure is *inevitable*
with non-coercive voting systems, as a possibility.
Suppose that IRV had been in use. We can predict majority failure,
but the "instant runoff process" of IRV simulates a series of
bottom-elimination runoffs. The winner may only have 30% of the vote.
But because of the trick of calling the "last round majority" a
"majority," and sometimes votes are reported that way, an
*appearance* of majority is created. A party candidate with only 30%
support might be fine, and he or she might be *awful*. If this is a
major party, and the candidate is to the extreme, i.e., not toward
the center, there goes the general election. Wasted.
No, a real majority is *highly advisable* if attainable. Bucklin
would get closer, with fewer majority failures, but a primary is a
tough nut to crack, because many voters will simply bullet vote, not
for the reason FairVote asserts, but out of habit or ignorance or
simply to express strong preference -- which does *not* mean that
they would not support another candidate.
Hence the obvious solution: Bucklin primary for a party primary.
Runoff if no majority found. It could also be a score primary with
explicit approval cutoff. The voting decisions are a little simpler
with Bucklin, that's all. The runoff, if it's Bucklin, can accomodate
up to three candidates and still be likely to find a majority.
"Unified primaries" -- i.e., the "jungle primary," with *partisan
elections* is a Bad Idea. But they make a great deal of sense with
nonpartisan elections. What we saw in Arizona, with the LVW/FairVote
interference, was a knee-jerk response to "jungle primaries," which
have often been perceived as a Republican trick.
Notice the thinking: it is "good" for voters to have more choices in
the general election. However, I'd submit, it's not so great if the
multiplicity of candidates is such that vote-splitting leads to poor
final choices. That's why the normal runoff ballot contingent is two
candidates. By definition, these are *not* widely variant as to
popularity, so variety of choice is reduced. Indeed, some voters may
abstain from the runoff for a basic cause:
They don't care which of the candidates wins, and they don't expect a
write-in victory. Notice: this does not mean they are displeased! It
*could* mean that, or it could mean the opposite.
It seems to me that Median and Bucklin advocates should come to a
consensus on what specific system to promote, and what to call it.
That doesn't mean we should cease discussing the different systems
in fora like these; just that when promoting systems to the public,
we should be on the same page.
Bucklin is widely known as Bucklin, the Grand Junction system, and
it was simply called "preferential voting" in many places. It was
also called "American Preferential Voting," to distinguish it from
"foreign" systems (i.e, STV methods).
... and now the best term is "Bucklin"? Abd, I know you like to
think out loud. But we need to pick a term and stick with it.
Who is "we." I call the system Bucklin. If CES or other activist
organization wants to fix on a name, like IRAV, instant runoff
approval voting, I'd support it. However, I *do* want to clearly
connect with history. So a page might say:
Instant Runoff Approval Voting
(Bucklin, Grand Junction System, American Preferential Voting.)
And then any variation from, say, the Grand Junction System -- which
is a *very specific name* -- would be explained. I.e., ER in all
ranks, no sequential dropping of minor candidates. (Why in the world
did Bucklin do that? Later, it was realized it was useless, and if it
ever *did* make a difference, i.e., a minor candidate later got a
plurality and the amalgamation ended, *why* would they refuse the win?)
Which system is best? I think the clear choices are MCA or GMJ, and
I'd personally favor GMJ. MCA is the simplest well-defined median
system. GMJ is good because:
* Unlike the specific systems called "Bucklin", it has no
vestige of ranked thinking, and thus requires no dishonest strategy.
That's naive.
I'm sorry, there's been a basic misunderstanding here, which has
repercussions throughout the rest of your reply below. When I said
"dishonest strategy", I didn't just mean "strategy"; I meant
actively preference-reversing strategy.
I'll stick with "naive."
In other words, "dishonest as opposed to semi-honest" strategy,
not "dishonest strategy as opposed to honest voting". The fact that
strictly ranked systems always require dishonest strategy, while
rated systems often don't, is a simple consequence of the
gibbard-saterthwaite theorem: in ranked systems, dishonest strategy
is the only kind that exists, so if there's always some strategy,
it must be dishonest.
Bucklin is *not* a "stricly ranked system." It is "category ranking."
I.e., Score. I'm sure you realize that Score uses a ranked ballot,
right? I.e,. the scores are ranks, and it is merely that equal
ranking is allowed, as well as empty ranks.
So I wasn't being naive, but I may have been being over-technical
and/or cryptic.
I'll stick with "naive," without denying the possible nature of the
naivete. "over-technical" can be naive. I don't think you were
cryptic, Jameson. You were *incorrect*. You collapsed "ranked
thinking" with "ranked system." Ranked thinking is how I make
choices, routinely. But I allow equal ranking, i.e., categorization. I.e.
*Favorite idea, my choice. I may not consider much beyond this, I
might just *do it.* If it's been working for me, and if I sense it as possible.
*Ideas to be considered as alternatives.
*Forget about it.
If there is more than one Favorite, I simply pick one. I don't search
for a "reason." It's part of my training, it's called the "Chocolate
or Vanilla" exercise. The point is that if the choice depends on
"reasons," it's not a choice, it's just machinery. The whole concept
of "best choice" is a bit of an oxymoron. And, in reality, our
"reasons" are mostly rationalizations, we discover. It's the past
binding the present.
That *has* a function. But it's also highly limiting, and the search
for the "best" solution can be *paralyzing.* Or guilt-producing if we "fail."
Ranked systems that allow equal ranking are *not* the ranked systems
that have been extensively analyzed. If they allow and value skipped
ranks, they are *fully* not ranked systems, they are cardinal
systems, what Arrow recently called "category" systems. Bucklin was,
apparently, analyzed in Bayesian Regret simulations as if it were a
ranked system.
* It's more expressive than MCA.
* Unlike MJ, GMJ can easily be expressed in terms of a
Bucklin-like descending threshold, a single algebraic formula, or a
graphing procedure. (As far as I know, MJ can only be expressed in
one way). GMJ is also easier to "program" into a spreadsheet in my experience.
* Unlike MJ, GMJ results can be succinctly and unambiguously
expressed as a single number for each candidate.
* Unlike MJ, the GMJ winner for a given honestly-voted utility
profile tend to be stable as the number of evenly-spaced grading
categories varies, even in moderately "pathological" examples (such
as a single-peaked versus a two-peaked candidate).
* However, the actual results will agree with other median
systems in almost all realistic cases.
What should we call it? GMJ isn't a horrible name, but if people
prefer to use one of the above "branding" terms or something
similar, I'd be open to discussing it.
I *very much* dislike the use of letter grades that imply absolute
ratings. It is essentially suggesting to the voter that they
disempower themselves.
The only thing that disempowers a voter in a Bucklin system is if
they vote both of the top two distinct options on the same side of
both the first and second place medians. (I say "distinct options"
to allow for the case where the voter intentionally supported or
opposed two near-clones.) I do not think that grades encourage that
any more than numbered categories. In fact, because the range
containing the top two grades would be more stable from election to
election with letter grades (or other non-comparative categories,
such as words), it would actually be less likely.
What grades encourage is placing the candidates in absolute
categories rather than relative ones. If the voter votes the highest
category and the lowest, the voter is voting full power.
What Jameson describes above is *not* the general case. I.e,. the
voter, voting, does not know where the medians will lie, so voting
the favorite, say, at lower than the top rating, *may* disempower the
voter. Likewise at the other end, though the effect there is less
obvious. The low end can make a difference if a majority is required,
under some rules.
The whole discussion about "dishonest strategy" is contaminated with
judgment against the normal think we do with choices, our internal
ratings are highly dependent on expectations *in the particular
case*, and people who don't do that tend to be unhappy.
Again, this stems from the misunderstanding of what I meant to say above.
I don't think so, yet.
But I think it's important for us to join our voices in better
harmony on this. Abd, in particular: why do you continue to talk
about "Bucklin" (ie, the grand junction system) when there are
better-designed, more-clearly-defined Bucklin systems available today?
The Grand Junction System is adequately defined, but the system I'd
recommend now is Bucklin-ER, to start. Three ranks.
All three ranks are approved ranks. In *some* elections, two ranks
might be used.
So, you favor "Bucklin-ER" as a system over GMJ? Is that simply
because of the letter grades?
Perhaps. I have not *thoroughly analyzed GMJ.* Explain the difference.
The *meaning* of a vote in a voting system is the effect it has. Any
"name" for the vote is potentially misleading. Indeed, Approval
voting is often criticized based on an assumed meaning of "I approve
of this candidate," when the candidate may be a mere
least-of-two-evils. The vote is an *action* of approval, not a
sentiment or absolute judgment.
It's more like "permit." I will *permit* this candidate to be elected.
And in a runoff system, this takes on a very specific indication,
that voters should understand. Voting for a candidate in the first
round of such a system has the effect of preferring the election of
the candidate to the inconvenience or other expected cost of a runoff
election. If the voter would rather see the runoff than have that
candidate win, they are unwise to "approve" the candidate.
That creates an *absolute utility test.* That is, in fact, likely to
improve results.
Jameson
ps. None of this message should be read as an attempt to abandon the
common effort to promote approval voting as a first step.
This is very simple. Approval first. The obvious first and most
significant objection to Approval, then, is addressed with ranked
approval. There is a method, approval-IRV, that has the LnH behavior
of IRV, if the voter wants that protection. But I actually think it
harms voter behavior to encourage excessive fear of LnH.
Look at the arguments for GMJ above. They will mostly be
unintelligible to ordinary citizens who are not specialists in voting systems.
I've expressed them in technical terms, yes, because in this forum
those terms are understood. But I could explain most of them in
simpler terms if need be.
Start there. I've seen numerous attempts to explain GMJ, and they are
are guaranteed, my sense, to lose most readers. Could be a problem
with expression, but I'm suspecting that it's worse than that. Do not
start, my advice, with tie-breaking. Start with what is simple and
likely. Add tie-breaking rules later.
But a tie in median grade is not based on "graduated median," and
such ties are quite likely. This is very much a problem created by
the use of median rather than sum-of-votes or average. And average
creates a problem with what will be very common: unrated candidates.
There is no such problem in Majority. Which is sum-of-votes, not
"average vote." Someone who abstains by not voting for a candidate is
treated as if they voted No. (In a real abstention, they do not vote
in the election.) Nor is a blank in Majority treated as mid-rating.
It is, quite simply, *not a consent to the election of that
candidate.* And classical systems are looking for *explicit majority consent.*
Anyway, the question isn't whether they're intelligible, it's
whether they're important. Please engage with them one by one.
So, I see this as one reform path.
1. Approval.
2. Bucklin-ER, 3-rank. (Traditional Grand Junction system plus equal
ranking *allowed* in all ranks.)
OK, stop here. We don't have to agree on steps 3-5. I largely do,
but I started this thread to talk about what specific system and
terms to use for step 2.
Great.
I can't understand exactly what you're saying about terms. But
that's OK, because which system is best is the first question.
No. This is an implementation path, and such paths only rarely *begin
with* the "best."
The differences between my proposal (GMJ with letter grades) and
your proposal (3 rank ER-Bucklin, using the highest majority as a
tiebreaker) are:
1. 5 levels versus 4. I think we'd both agree that this is relatively trivial.
This is what I place as a later tweak, i.e., I go to five levels,
i.e,. Range 4. There are then two unapproved categories and three
approved ones.
2. Letter grades versus numbered "ranks". I think letter grades are
clearly better, and I've said a little bit about why above. I'd like
to hear your argument.
I've given it above. I would not *oppose* a letter-grade
implementation, but would worry that it could lead to a backlash.
It's not been tried in any public elections, and, as I've stated, it
will, I expect, encourage relatively disempowered votes. But voters
might wise up to that.
3. Different tiebreaker. Advantages on either side:
ER-Bucklin: Simpler to explain.
You do understand, I hope, that this is a *huge* advantage. The
improvement in performance had better be major to justify this.
GMJ: More congruent with the Bucklin process. Slightly better
chicken dilemma resistance and strategy resistance in general.
Easier to give the results as numbers. Closer to MJ, which has a book about it.
"Better chicken dilemma resistance"? It's essentially the same
system, but grading *conceals* the choice to some extent. It's right
out in the open and obvious with Bucklin. The only "strategy" that
makes much sense with Bucklin is rank-skipping, which has a clear
effect: it expresses preference strength.
Bucklin was a "preponderance of the votes" system, seeking a
majority. Without a runoff process, it's a Plurality system, then.
That is, after the amalgamation process is complete, the winner is
the candidate with the most votes. That is *terminally simple,* and
is very easily understood.
With GMJ, there is the median vote, which will relatively often tie.
Hence the G in GMJ. GMJ substitutes a graduated median for sum of
votes. Thus each vote affects the "graduated median." So ties become rare.
Both systems, as practical systems, would need to have rules for true
tie-breaking.
Do you agree that it's worth trying to come to an agreement, and
that both of us should be ready to cede if necessary? How would you
like to do this; do you think third opinions would be good?
If we settle this question, we can move on to talking about names.
The appropriate agreement will certainly be wider, as happened with
Approval as a first step. What I think is needed is a recognition that:
1. Bucklin uses a Range ballot.
2. Bucklin provides *limited* later-no-harm protection.
3. Same as above, Bucklin allows clean and vote-splitting-harmless
expression of true favorite.
I am *not* proposing Bucklin as an "ideal" or "perfect" voting
system, though, for some contexts, it might be "good enough." If
Bucklin uses a full range ballot (i.e., Range 4 or higher, say), the
data is there to collect information on expressed relative utilities. Hence:
4. Bucklin will allow the collection of Range data. All this takes is
counting all the votes, which, in my view, is a courtesy to voters as
well as providing much better information to candidates and their supporters.
5. Thus, Bucklin will foster the "nursery effect," often cited by
Range supporters as a characteristic of Range voting.
As to names, the name should not be misleading. Bucklin is not
misleading. It's the name of a family of systems, though. IRAV might
work. Bucklin *does* simulate a series of approval elections without
eliminations but with voters being able to control the introduction
of additional approvals. Bucklin-ER is what I generally have in mind,
but I would not be opposed to an ordinary Bucklin system
implementation, ER merely makes the system, under some conditions, a
little more efficient. Non-ER Bucklin will result in the rejection of
overvotes, and conflicts with Count All the Votes, which is my own
fun name for Approval, that reduces it to what is actually done. No
judgment, no sentiment about 'approval,' just the *facts.*
Your vote will be counted. Period.
Jameson
Jameson signed here, but went on to make some more comments.
[I went on to discuss three more stages in a possible reform
path, leading to full runoff range.]
3. Full range ballot for Bucklin [adds . (*Range reporting starts,
and Condorcet analysis becomes more complete*)
4. Runoff with pairwise leader included if different. Runoff if
majority not found. Or unconditional runoff.
5. Range amalgamation substitutes for Bucklin amalgamation.
Resolution may be increased if needed. Approval information is
always collected.
All of this works with runoff voting. We should *not* attempt to
kill runoff voting as an *easy target*, and we should oppose
FairVote attempts to do this, there is basic information about this
to be included, and providing information for intelligent decisions is our job.
(If it were practical, approval voting with repeated Bucklin ballots
until a majority is found is a *highly sophisticated system*.)
We don't know the Bayesian Regret performance of Bucklin, because
the testing that was done, AFAIK, did not understand a Bucklin
ballot as being a Range ballot, but treated it as a ranked ballot.
Warren did test a continuous median system. That is probably a
better approximation of rated Bucklin systems than what's called
"Bucklin" in his tests.
And the results?
The Bucklin ballot I'd see at the 3rd step could even have letters
attached, it's really a Range 4 ballot, just as the step 2 ballot is
that ballot without the elevated but unapproved rating of "1:
included. So A is 4.0, as people expect. But I'd want to see the
method in actual use *first*, to avoid misleading voters. If you
really want to give all politicians a bad rating, then you should
totally realize that you are disempowering yourself, not casting a
full vote, to *make a choice.*
Oh, right. You're worried that people will rate everyone badly?
I'm not "worried" about this, because *it will happen.* The *concern*
is that some voters will do this without understanding that they are,
thereby, disempowering themselves. The expression must be allowed.
However, voters will have the option, at least in the U.S., to vote
for a write-in candidate. If they want to bullet vote for the
write-in, great. It is their choice.
I can understand why people might have that impulse, but I think
anybody who did that would intuitively realize that they are giving
up some voting power.
Do understand that this objection is essentially raised by *experts*.
The classic Saari objection to Range Voting is based on an example
where 99% of voters do that. The Saari objection is based on an idea
that voters are supposed to make a choice. He's correct, but doesn't
seem to understand that voters may choose to *strongly approve* of
all candidates. Give them all an A! However, will these voters later
have regret? When they see the results, will they be kicking themselves?
These are *questions*, not declarations of Truth (TM).
Also, it would be good to educate people that they're "grading on
a historical curve". Someone who thinks (say) that Obama is
objectively horrible but also in the top 15% of presidents
historically, would be perfectly justified in giving him an A on
that latter basis.
No. "Historical curve" is a disempowering standard. The "curve" is
the present candidate set, and if we want to be even more specific
about it, it is the "expected set of possible winners." Someone who
thinks that Obama is "objectively horrible" is only going to give him
an A if he thinks that Obama is the *best* of all the possible
winners. And even then it will grate.
"A" has an ordinary meaning to people. Above, it's acknowledged by
Jameson that, in the voting system, it does not *actually mean that.*
So why use it? Why not just label the category with the effect?
4. Maximum support.
3. Middle support.
2. Minimum support.
1. No support.
0. Maximum opposition.
In fact, those could be labelled with the letters *as long as the
meaning is clear.*
A. Max
B. Med
C. Min
D. No Pass
F. Fail.
I even used "fail" there. How's that? There should be no way for a
candidate with majority (D or F) to pass, i.e., to win the election.
An F is a maximum action toward including the candidate in a runoff.
A D might provide some effect toward that.
Bucklin could be reported, by the way, as a net grade point average
for candidates, the values averaged would be the numbers of 0 plus
2-4. If the additional unapproved level of 1 is included on the
ballot, it's then a complete Range set. And candidates can be given
that single "grade" that Jameson wants. Voting is *choice*, not
absolute rating.
????? what? You're suggesting running Score but calling it
"Bucklin"? Obviously not, but I'm confused.
Jameson, then you have not been paying attention, and you are not
using independent thinking. I.e, you are being "ordinary." I'm
expecting more from you. How about it?
Take a Range ballot. Amalgamate it as Bucklin, i.e., amalgamate the
first rank votes. Majority? Done. Multiple majority, candidate with
the most votes. If not done, step down through the ranks, adding in
votes as additional approvals. Done when a majority found, if more
than one has a majority, candidate with the most votes.
This is *obviously* a Bucklin method, simply with more ranks. I would
not call it "Score," except to say that it uses a Score ballot. The
amalgamation and decision method is that of Bucklin. If it is Range
4, with rating of 1 missing, it *is* Bucklin-ER.
I think I'll stop responding now because you're moving beyond
Bucklin systems to even more ideal options. That's fine and I agree
with a lot of what you say but it's not the topic I wanted to talk about here.
Fine. Next step beyond Approval. I say, "ranked Approval," which is
well-known and widely tested as "Bucklin." The U.S. lost a great deal
when Bucklin was dropped, almost entirely for narrow partisan
reasons. The runoff voting reform was more popular, and people simply
did not realize that a hybrid was possible. Bucklin would avoid
runoffs in many elections. Approval would avoid fewer.
Partisan primaries are *also* an advanced system, we simply haven't
thought of them that way. Open primaries are somewhat advanced, but
with vote-for-one, they suffer from obvious problems. Approval will
help, Bucklin will help *much more*, still allowing sincere first
preference votes without harm. And if there is still majority
failure, as can be expected in nonpartisan elections with many
candidates on the ballot, then there are runoffs. -- or there is a
general election with intelligent selection of candidates for the
ballot from the primary results. (It is then not the first round in a
runoff system, but a nomination device for the general election, and,
in the U.S., we would always allow write-ins in the general election
as well as in the primary, so possible problems can be fixed by the
electorate.)
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