Jameson,
 
I don't like this version at all. These methods all have the problem that the 
voters have a strong incentive to just submit approval ballots, i.e. only use 
the top and bottom grades.
 
Your suggested way of determining a winner among candidates who first get a 
majority in the same round only makes that incentive a bit stronger still.
 
I agree with a Mike Ossipoff suggestion, that we elect the member of that set 
of candidates with the most above-bottom votes.
 
Also, given the strong truncation incentive, I think 5 grades is one too many. 
In my opinion 4 grades would be adequately expressive.

My favourite Bucklin-like method is "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent 
Fallback-Approval" (aka IBFA) that I introduced in May 2010.
 
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2010-May/026479.html
 
"A, B, C, D" are probably better names for the ratings slots than the "Top, 
Middle1, Middle2, Bottom" in that post.

Comparing it to Bucklin, it meets Independence from Irrelevant Ballots which 
means that adding or removing a few ballots that bullet-vote for nobody 
(ignored on all the other ballots) can't change the winner.

The small "price" paid for this (apart from greater complexity) is that it 
fails Later-no-Help. That is mostly a benefit because it weakens the truncation 
incentive.

The other advantage of IBIFA over Bucklin is that it is far more likely to 
elect the Condorcet winner. If the winners are different then the IBIFA winner 
will always pairwise beat the Bucklin (or Majority Judgement) winner.

Chris Benham

Jameson Quinn wrote (19 June 2013):
 
Here's the current version of the article. Note the new paragraph on strategy 
at the bottom.
---------

Majority Approval Voting (MAV) is a modern,
evaluative<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Evaluative> version of Bucklin 
voting <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Bucklin_voting>. Voters rate each 
candidate into one of a predefined set of ratings or grades, such as the letter 
grades "A", "B", "C", "D", and "F". As with any Bucklin system, first the 
top-grade ("A") votes for each candidate are counted as
approvals. If one or more candidate has a majority, then the highest majority 
wins. If not, votes at next grade down ("B") are added to each candidate's 
approval scores. If there are one or more candidates with a
majority, the winner is whichever of those had more votes at higher grades (the 
previous stage). If there were no majorities, then the next grade down("C") is 
added and the process repeats; and so on.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Reply via email to