At 02:16 PM 6/30/2013, David L Wetzell wrote:
I've argued that the combination of aspects of the US political
system in our constitution, namely the import of winner-take-all
presidential/senatorial/gubernatorial elections(obviously hard to
change), + habits built up among many US voters( used to 2-party
dominated system, inequalities in the quality/quantity of eduation)
+ bounded rationality of voters make it wise to assume the continued
two-party domination of the US political system.
While it may be *reasonable* to assume continued domination, in some
areas, it is not *wise*. Essentially, one of the possible positive
functions of voting system reform would be encouragement of a healthy
multiparty system, even if there continue to be two major parties *in
most elections.*
We *already have* places in the U.S., with elections, where there are
three major parties.
I have argued more recently that in addition that economic
factors involved with running for an important single-winner
election tend to reduce the number of competitive candidates and in
combination with the likely continued 2-party domination reduce the
feedback loop from a change in election rule to increased numbers
of competitive candidates in single-winner elections.
IRV is being promoted for nearly all elections, regardless of
conditions. We know that advanced voting systems will encourage
additional candidates to run, that's obvious and it shouldn't be
questioned. Yes, there are natural limits in those "important
single-winner elections," i.e,. elections on a large scale. We do not
clearly know how rapidly a minor party might grow if not for the
first-order spoiler effect, which IRV does resolve.
Howver, given that minor parties still often maintain ballot
presence, given how much of an obstacle currently exists for such
parties, due to Plurality voting, given that IRV would not increase
the obstacle, it would relieve it and open the door, David's argument
seems facile. Once minor parties can get, in public elections,
validation for true support and thus increased ballot position, we
can expect *as a reasonable possibility* that, in places, the minor
party will rise to parity.
And that is precisely where IRV breaks down, badly, as it did break
down in Burlington. IRV is a *terrible* single-winner method when
there are three viable candidates or more. So why set this up? Why
not use a *simpler* method that also addresses the spoiler effect?
Bucklin would do it with ease, it is extremely easy to understand, no
surprises, and it has what I'd call "historical momentum."
FairVote has attempted to confuse that history, it's one of their
more objectionable activities. Bucklin worked. It did not do
everything that was claimed for it, that's all. It did not magically
generate majorities in party primaries, but there is *no* claim that
it caused harm. Bucklin is *better* than IRV as to finding
majorities, in a nonpartisan election context (and a party primary is
a nonpartisan election), because it can uncover support for a
candidate, underneath support for the favorite. Bucklin votes only
add, and there are no eliminations. It's "instant runoff Approval."
But no method can handle voter ignorance, which is the primary cause
of bullet voting. The other cause is strong preference for the
favorite, which means that Bucklin would be collecting information on
*preference strength*, which is very important for party primaries!
We can assume with Bucklin that first preference votes are the same
as they would be with IRV, the differences will appear in lower preferences.
(An exception would be if voters are allowed to vote for more than
one in first preference: but voters, with Bucklin, will only do this
if they have no strong preference. That's a feature, not a bug. I've
argued that IRV should also allow multiple votes at a rank.)
My next arg was that if the average number of competitive candidates
wouldn't be likely to grow too much with the adoption of a,
Condorcet-like or Approval-like or IRV-like election rule that it
would lower the value-added from Condorcet-like or Approval-like
rules relative to a variant of IRV.
*Any method* that eliminates the first-order spoiler effect will
encourage *many* more candidacies. I don't see that I understood,
however, what David was saying here. Too many variable or negative
conditions to parse readily.
I then have argued that if the short-run probability of widespread
implementation of an IRV-like rule in our current US system with all
of the previous conditional factors plus the first-mover marketing
advantage of IRV-like system out weighs the short-run probabilities
of other alternatives to FPP then it doesn't per se matter if there
is some value-added from such alternatives relative to IRV.
This is a circular argument. The "marketing advantage" of IRV is
useless if the method will be rejected. More people know about IRV,
yes, and most of them don't know about the problems, but ... these do
come out in campaigns for implementation. We have to notice, now, how
many jurisdictions have tried IRV and have later rejected it. Maybe
it's time for a fresh approach.
This is what I'd predict: at great expense, a jurisdiction implements
IRV. As a result, a minor party grows in strength until it challenges
a major party. Then there is a spectacular failure, where voters
realize that they'd have gotten a better result by not voting. They
realize that the promise that they could now vote sincerely was a
*lie.* They realize that the promise of finding majorities was
*highly deceptive.*
And so they dump IRV, and, good chance, they go back to what was in
place before. At least, with Plurality, people understand the effect
of their vote. And it's cheap and easy to count. And so all that
implementation work, and the prior campaign, were not only *wasted*,
but harm was done to the voting reform movement.
Really, David, FairVote should stop the deceptive advertising and
focus on what is real and what is true reform. FairVote lost their
original purpose in their "momentum." By suggesting we all sign up
for that parade you are suggesting that we validate deception. Not
likely, David. We, and the entire planet, are moving in a very
different direction.
[...]
So I take offense at having my views characterized as "religious" or
anti-reason when I made clear the diffs between me and Herr
Kristofer were epistemic, simply not easy to reconcile from evidence
readily available.
We could be less polite if you wish.
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