On 09/09/2013 11:50 PM, Forest Simmons wrote:
Kristofer,
Thanks for your insights and considerations regarding the method and my
questions.
It is true as you noted that there is no game theoretic incentive to
vote insincerely on the second ballot,(unless this election is
considered as part of an ongoing game including future elections as
well), it is also true, as you point out, that there is no incentive to
vote complete preferences on the second ballot.
You then say ...
"If you just want to find a winner, then an ordinary runoff might work
as well: select the finalists as above, then have a majority-rule
election in the second round."
The trouble with this ordinary runoff idea is that the runoff stage
(potentially) over-rides the strategic pairwise preferences implicit in
the three slot ballots. In other words it throws out our burial
disincentive.
Isn't that easily fixed? Consider the runoff part of your method
description:
The runoff between them is decided by the voters' pairwise
>>> preferences as expressed on the three slot ballots (when these
>>> finalists are not rated equally thereon), or (otherwise) on the
>>> ordinal ballots when the three slot ballot makes no distinction
>>> between them.
Couldn't you adapt this to a manual runoff? Something like:
1. Determine the virtual runoff candidates X and Y.
2. If there's a pairwise difference between the two on the three slot
ballots, then whoever it favors, wins.
3. If there's no difference between the two, then go to a manual
tiebreak runoff.
Or would that mean runoffs would happen so rarely that the electorate
would fail to get used to them?
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