Hi -
> [...] What I want is simply make it easy for the user to say where
> they expect the sources are. So there is no surprises.
If this were a mandate, it would be a hassle, for any build that's
more than one directory wide.
> > The -F mode is suitable for sharing build trees. By definition, the
> > content is going to be up to the runtime whims of the system, because
> > even non-/usr/include files may change between one build and the next.
> > This is okay, it is just like running gdb on an older binary when the
> > source trees have changed. (We even propagate mtimes to the client,
> > so gdb can notice it the same way as if it were local.)
>
> -F mode does indeed seem suitable for sharing local build trees. If
> we add a big warning about it possibly sharing all local files.
OK, will add a cautionary blurb to the man page.
> > The compiled-in default for the binary is off. The systemd service
> > default, it happens to be on, but it's configured to serve only
> > privileged directories that people with bad compilers cannot sneak
> > binaries into. People running personal servers can/should use -F as
> > they see fit. In the context of a normal workgroup - it's fine.
>
> So -F seems fine for the later, just not for the former.
IMHO, even the former seems okay and even desirable:
debuginfod -F /usr/lib/debug
is a safe & easy way to relay the contents of all the debuginfo rpms
that were installed, to nearby clients. All those binaries come from
packages/distros, so are at least as high quality & trustworthiness as
the user's own. Again I offer to do an audit of some distro debuginfo
that all their source refs are milquetoast like /usr/include or
/usr/src/debug.
> > System certs do not serve to authenticate clients. Client
> > certificates are per-user things that come with their own management
> > headaches. Will think about authentication matters in the future.
>
> I thought ca-certificates.crt were normally used to authenticate
> remote servers.
ca-certificates.crt types of files (or /usr/share/pki/ files) are the
trust roots for validating the *servers'* certificates. They are
generally provided by the distro, so can't possibly serve as unique
*client* authentication.
- FChE
