"M. Levinson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > But as I recall, I was still left wondering if there's a > sufficiently portable way to determine whether a Py_ssize_t > value could overflow an off_t when the len from > PyString_AsStringAndSize() is passed to > normalize_cache_entry(), which takes an off_t parameter.
Well, Py_ssize_t is supposed to be the same size as size_t, and I think it's unlikely that anyone would define off_t as smaller than size_t. parse_bencoding_integer() does arithmetic with off_t and needs to detect overflows. It currently assumes that the numbers will wrap around. On recent versions of GCC, this requires -fno-strict-overflow, which precludes some optimizations. Other compilers may require other options that I don't know about. So parse_bencoding_integer() should instead be changed to detect the overflows before they happen (bug 1012). For this, we'll need OFF_MAX, which unfortunately does not seems to be in C99 or POSIX. So, I think ELinks should define OFF_MIN and OFF_MAX (or similar ELinks-specific macros) in a header file, based on sizeof(off_t); if that is not right for some machine, #ifdefs can be added. src/scripting/python/ could then use these as well.
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