When the missile launched it struck another aircraft, the pilot was John Mccain, now Senator John McCain. Bill
From: Ken Javor [mailto:ken.ja...@emccompliance.com] Sent: Thursday, March 27, 2003 3:37 PM To: boconn...@t-yuden.com; emc-p...@majordomo.ieee.org Subject: Re: Help wanted with succinct subject description for non-special ists It is interesting, nonetheless, to note that the disaster occurred in July 1967, and in September of that year, MIL-E-6051C, EMC Requirements, Systems, was updated to the "D" revision, which for the first time required 20 dB safety margin demonstrations for EEDs. Coincidence? Perhaps... Ken Javor on 3/27/03 1:20 PM, boconn...@t-yuden.com at boconn...@t-yuden.com wrote: Sir I must concur with Mr Woodgate. This particular instance in (very) infamous in the U.S. Navy & USMC, but mostly for shipboard fire-fighting instruction and damage control protocol. The flight-deck videos of this are still shown to students of the fire-fighting school for carrier crew. The aircraft in question was stationary in the flight deck; it was not in the landing phase. The failure mode was a faulty connector. One of the major changes invoked by this disaster was the extensiion/formalization of enviromental stress testing (shock. vibration, & thermal). EMC was not, IMO, considered part of the root cause. R/S, Brian -----Original Message----- From: King, Richard Sent: Thursday, March 27, 2003 7:18 AM To: emc-p...@majordomo.ieee.org Subject: RE: Help wanted with succinct subject description for non-special ists I should reiterate from my original message that the text I posted is the introduction to an article, not a complete article. The example was included to engage the reader from the start; demonstrate that electromagnetic compatibility between systems is a real-world issue; and show that a lack of EMC can have severe consequences. It highlights the importance of compatibility between systems in their operating environment, not the importance of compliance with standards in a laboratory, which I agree is often a separate matter. Any other examples that illustrate these points would be gratefully received. Best regards, Richard King Systems Engineer Thales Communications UK > -----Original Message----- > From: John Woodgate [SMTP:j...@jmwa.demon.co.uk] > Sent: Thursday, March 27, 2003 9:54 AM > To: emc-p...@majordomo.ieee.org > Subject: Help wanted with succinct subject description for > non-special ists > > >In 1967 off the coast of Vietnam, a jet landing on the aircraft carrier > >U.S.S. Forrestal was briefly illuminated by carrier-based radar. This is > >quite a normal event, however the energy from the radar caused a stray > >electrical signal to be sent to the jet weapon systems. The result was an > >uncommanded release of munitions that struck a fully armed and fuelled > >fighter on deck. The subsequent explosions killed 134 sailors and caused > >severe damage to the carrier and aircraft. > > This is an appallingly bad example, insofar as it was caused by a > **fault condition**. EMC standards, and the testing itself, do not take > fault conditions into account. There is a separate subject 'EMC and > functional safety', which is incredibly complicated. If you just think > about it for a while, you will see why. > > Don't let your audience think that EMI occurs only when source or victim > is faulty. EMI occurs when both would be working perfectly normally if > the EMI were not present. > -- > Regards, John Woodgate, OOO - Own Opinions Only. -- Ken Javor EMC Compliance Huntsville, Alabama 256/650-5261
