Some of these threads cause me to meta-think. I have just looked at some trend lines slowly creep across the monitor that represent several parameters of a box that is running under an abnormal operating condition. I come back to the test bench from an environmental chamber, where I am torturing something else - then I am thinking about how I am thinking about Thiokol, EADS (Ariane 501), AECL (Therac-25), etc. Yes, what I am doing is much less complex, but it is all on me; and if I fail to find a problem and allow it to go to production, then the problem is not systemic. Either I screwed up, or I was ignored.
At a PREVIOUS place of employee, I was pulled into a managers' meeting. When it was evident that they were going to ignore my advice, I said "Good people, it seems that we are having a Morton Thiokol moment". With much respect to Mr Javor, I do not believe in a "systemic problem". Sometime, somewhere, there was a singular decision to take a risk, or deny that there is a significant risk. R/S, Brian From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]On Behalf Of Ken Javor Sent: Friday, December 18, 2009 12:24 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [PSES] Emissions from Computer power supplies - update I offer a slightly different interpretation of the O-ring tragedy than Messrs. McDiarmid and Mr. O’Connell et al. As at many other large organizations, there is a strong line of demarcation between management and engineering responsibilities within NASA. This results in a Balkanization of priorities, where management is primarily concerned with getting the job done, and the engineers are primarily concerned with getting things right. Managers come up the ranks from engineering, but once they move up a few levels they are in charge of engineering disciplines they do not understand well. At that point, they have to rely on engineers’ inputs to make important decisions concerning issues they do not fully understand. When engineers on average appear to have a strongly vested position in no risk at the expense of schedule, and when the suggestions they offer, again on average, do not support schedules and appear to be self-serving in that they are overly conservative, then on average managers begin to lose faith in engineering’s inputs, and they rely more and more on their own gut feel. That works only as long as the decision is rooted in a discipline the manager understands, but it can be disastrous when he is outside his area of competency. I liken this to the fable of the little boy who cried wolf. When managers repeatedly get answers they cannot use from engineering, engineering loses credibility, and management cannot tell the difference between a real warning, and business as usual. In conclusion, I am saying this is a systemic problem, in that the organizational split in job priorities results in a severing of authority, and responsibility. Once that happens, the organization decision making process is damaged. Ken Javor Phone: (256) 650-5261 From: <[email protected]> List-Post: [email protected] List-Post: [email protected] List-Post: [email protected] Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2009 11:02:54 -0800 To: <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PSES] Emissions from Computer power supplies - update As I recall, the NASA rocket booster O-ring tragedy was attributed to putting programme schedule above all other concerns. _______________________________________ _____________________________________________ Ralph McDiarmid | Schneider Electric | Renewable Energies Business | CANADA | Project Technologist Phone: +1-604-422-2622 | Fax: +1-604-421-3029 | Email: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> | Site: www.xantrex.com <http://www.xantrex.com/> | Address: 8999 Nelson Way, Burnaby, BC V5A 4B5, CANADA *** Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail From: John Woodgate <[email protected]> To: [email protected] List-Post: [email protected] List-Post: [email protected] List-Post: [email protected] Date: 12/18/2009 10:56 AM Subject: Re: [PSES] Emissions from Computer power supplies - update In message <690230e9cf51aa4ebf639fae9216d5b1015a4...@mer2-exchrec1.echostar.com>, dated Fri, 18 Dec 2009, "Grasso, Charles" <[email protected]> writes: >Sorry Brian - I guess I do not understand your position. Are you saying >that North American companies are not requiring compliant product? It's almost certainly a lot more complicated than just a blatant 'Ship us non-compliant product.' Remember NASA's 'O-rings'? Delinquency is most often spread thinly through both supplier and customer. -- OOO - Own Opinions Only. Try www.jmwa.demon.co.uk <www.jmwa.demon.co.uk> and www.isce.org.uk <www.isce.org.uk> John Woodgate, J M Woodgate and Associates, Rayleigh, Essex UK - This message is from the IEEE Product Safety Engineering Society emc-pstc discussion list. To post a message to the list, send your e-mail to <[email protected]> All emc-pstc postings are archived and searchable on the web at: http://www.ieeecommunities.org/emc-pstc Graphics (in well-used formats), large files, etc. can be posted to that URL. Website: http://www.ieee-pses.org/ Instructions: http://listserv.ieee.org/request/user-guide.html List rules: http://www.ieee-pses.org/listrules.html For help, send mail to the list administrators: Scott Douglas <[email protected]> Mike Cantwell <[email protected]> For policy questions, send mail to: Jim Bacher: <[email protected]> David Heald: <[email protected]>
