Hi Davin, We obviously treat different entities differently.
But this is not the same as saying that these entities are ontologically different. Yours, Tim http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman <davinheck...@gmail.com> wrote: > Thank you Ian, for these thoughts. My initial encounter with this > work came via a brief discussion of "flat ontology," which I found > somewhat offputting. I followed up by reading through the re:press > book. What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the > discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating. > > Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they resonate with > one of my favorite passages from Hegel. Pardon me for cannibalizing > another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here: > http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-criticism). > * > In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical process: > > "The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one > might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the > fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false > manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of > it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, > they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the > same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in > which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary > as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of > the whole." [1] > > Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned > outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the dynamic > processes that comprise its totality. > > This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in light > of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to > fundamentally alter Hegel’s argument, I only mean to suggest that we > see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have > shaken up the pursuit of knowledge. > * > I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to > embrace a kind of "humanism," but one which cannot easily understand > as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an > ontology that is expressed in our metaphors. One grip I have with the > use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to > personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a situation in > which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines, > interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same > thing. When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or computer, > while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic > investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense of > obligation to, rather than ownership over) child. If my bike decided > to bite me.....which it can't, even if it can hurt me.... I would not > feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally > florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy reason (but > with my three year old, I he is only a missed nap away from engaging > in something so obvious and horrible as biting someone). A bike, on > the other hand, can hurt me a lot more than a bite from a toddler, and > I suppose I am not above kicking a bike and yelling.... but I have > very limited feelings about a bike malfunction or hitting my thumb > with a hammer. On the other hand, a bike goes wherever I want it to > go (except when there's an accident)..... a toddler, not so much.... > an eight year old, he usually comes with a counter proposal (and it is > a monstrous adult that would treat kids like a bike, insist that they > only go where told, speak when it is demanded). A lot of really deep > thinking about human subjectivty simply does not go this far.... and > part of this has to do with a poor understanding of objects. What is > worse is when this understanding infects interpersonal relationships > in the context of a Randian sort of world where there is "no such > thing as society, only individuals" (yet, bosses treat workers like > bikes and bad boyfriends treat their partners like robots). > > I am very excited to read more. I feel like it is important to free > our thinking from patterns and habits of the past. In particular, the > culture of academic citation has gone from being about finding good > ideas where they are to deriving authority from the aura of the great > figure. I also have no problem with accumulations of wisdom that > translate into an inherited perspective, but this can't close us off > to thinking. So.... thank you for this! > > Davin > > On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu> > wrote: >> Davin, >> >> I'm about to disappear into a mess of meetings, but let me offer a brief >> response: >> >> What you're touching on here is what Levi Byrant sometimes calls the "weird >> mereology" of OOO. The song isn't "just" the sound waves (what Harman calls >> an underming position) nor is it just the social context of creation and use >> (an overmining position). A song is a song, and indeed, the song in an MP3 >> file is a different thing than the song as an abstraction in human culture. >> Neither is more object nor more real (well, "real" has a different meaning >> for Harman than it does for Levi and me). >> >> I talk about this a bit in the first chapter of Alien Phenomenology, and >> Levi does as well in the mereology section of Democracy of Objects. Also, >> here are a blog post from Levi on the subject that weaves the two >> together: >> http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/08/12/more-strange-mereology/ >> >> I'm not answering sufficiently but wanted to get something out to you >> rapidly. >> >> ib >> >> Ian Bogost, Ph.D. >> Professor >> Director, Graduate Program in Digital Media >> >> Georgia Institute of Technology >> Digital Media/TSRB 320B >> 85 Fifth Street NW >> Atlanta, GA 30308-1030 >> >> ibog...@gatech.edu >> +1 (404) 894-1160 (tel) >> +1 (404) 894-2833 (fax) >> >> >> >> >> >> On Jun 15, 2012, at 4:11 AM, davin heckman wrote: >> >> Ian, >> >> Since we are on the topic of OOO, I was wondering what the ontological >> status of something like a song is? I have to admit, I have a real >> hard time swallowing a pure ontology that essentially defines the >> subjective as outside of being, as a sort of on or off proposition, as >> opposed to also a turning on (or is it being turned on? Or simply to >> be turned or to turn?) (I am generally skeptical about a variety of >> posthumanisms that go beyond a critique of a monolithic Humanism, >> because I think that consciousness carries specific tendencies that >> seem to fundamentally frame all possibilities for knowledge). However >> it is entirely possible that I am missing out on a discussion that has >> been unfolding without me. >> >> But here's my thought: With a song, you have something that can be >> rendered in "objective" form.... maybe an mp3 file or a sheet of >> notes or record or something. If this is what we mean by a song, >> then, fine, that's an object. But a song only really starts doing >> something when it is unfolding within the context of memory and >> anticipation. It only is a song when it is listened to by a subject, >> which is to say it is an object that has a singular temporal being as >> it is listened to, which is distinct from how it is being listened to >> and replayed even by the same user. (And we aren't even beginning to >> talk about non-recorded music). The only way a song becomes a purely >> discrete object is when it is removed from its temporal existence and >> understood as a totality, and detached from an audience. And while we >> can sit around and all talk about, say, "Another One Bites the Dust," >> after we squeeze it into a conceptual file type and label it, the fact >> that we can discuss something that can only mean something if is >> experienced as a process AND an object within the context of a >> experience, suggests that sometimes being is realized by the relations >> of things, rather than the things themselves. My suggestion is that >> the ontological nature of the song cannot be described in objective >> terms without missing what a song is. Without the non-objective >> component of its being, a song is just sound. If we say, well, "Hey, >> when this sound occurs, people do X, Y, and Z," we can find ourself >> thinking that these effects are produced by the object, but this sort >> of thought experiment only gives us half an understanding of the >> object's being. You also have to think of that song in relation to >> the current context, to itself over time, to the individual and >> collective experience of its audience, to the culture, etc. Again, a >> great means to produce estrangement, but not the complete account of >> what the thing is. At the risk of sounding chauvinistic, I can see >> that it might be expedient to regard a distant moon without regard to >> its historical relationship to the human. It's useful to think of a >> distant moon as a quantity of data. But the closer we get to human >> existence, the more likely we are to encounter types of things that >> exist, but that cannot be understood properly as a bundle of discrete >> data. Maybe there are some texts that address precisly these sorts of >> concerns. >> >> This is where I think ontology cannot simply be objective. It must, >> of course, be able to establish the differences between things, to >> render those things it claims to understand in discrete form, insofar >> as they can be considered as such. On the other hand, we know that >> most of what the world is made of is common and that the laws of >> physics, for instance, harness discrete things under a kind of >> continuity. So, along with the conditions of radical difference that >> a philosophy of objects implies, there are the conditions of radical >> connectivity. Both features are equally present, which is to say they >> offer us little in the way of productive knowledge EXCEPT insofar as >> we can bind and sever, cut or tie, digitize or analogize within this >> framework of matter. The 21st century loves digitizing things..... >> it helps computers see the world, it helps them count us, predict our >> behavior, weigh it, value it, direct it, etc. But the digital is only >> half of our existence.... the analog process is equally present in >> language and cognition.... and it is just as equpped to help us >> understand the world by creating categories of things and identifying >> common qualities. In "Notes on the Uncanny," Freud identifies this >> struggle as productive of a kind of unsettling (the person that acts >> like an object/the object that acts like a person)... but it does not >> simply have to be a "scary" process.... the move from discrete to >> connected or from one into multiple can also be deeply satisfying and >> reassuring of being. If both processes are equally useful, then what >> presides over these two tendencies? Temporal consciousness that can >> mobilize processes of digitization and analogy? Another place to >> think through this is in relation to a variety of attempts at >> taxonomy. At some point, a poodle has to be a poodle and a wolf has >> to be a wolf, but in relation to squids, both can be canines. We >> could say that well, we are talking about layers of qualities that >> enable us to categorize this object or that object. But without the >> history of the poodle we don't really know how one canine can be a >> fashion accessory and the other is a part of a wild ecology, all of >> which (domesticating work dogs, turning tool animals into fashion >> animals, thinking about animals as people, killing wild animals, >> restoring wildness, etc) radically alter the parameters of being based >> on thoughts about being. To take it back to queer thought, around the >> bend of singular identities is the knowlege that such queerness does >> not preclude deep relationality. My reading is that the fruits of >> this thought are an affirmation of the idea that the well-worn paths >> of prescribed human behavior do not necessarily lead to earnest >> relationships, it is not to reject relationship itself in favor of >> individualism because capitalism has been doing this since the >> transformation of labor into commodity. >> >> Why does this matter? I care about politics, but I am not going to >> say that OOO cleaves to this or that kind of politics.... it doesn't >> matter. If a statement is discernibly true, then I have an obligation >> to bend my ideas around the true statement. And my sense, based on >> very limited reading, is that OOO is trying to figure out what we can >> know about being. So, while it is worth considering the political >> implications of speculative thought, I think Galloway is a bit wrong >> to suggest that something is "bourgeois" or something just because >> financial markets also offer a flat ontology via capital. The only >> thing that really matters is whether or not a philosophy can get us to >> a mutually agreed upon knowledge of the world that can be transmitted >> effectively from one context to another and continue to be useful. >> >> I have been lazy about following this month's discussion, but I like >> the idea of queering technology, of the productively broken tool. It >> is an area that has affinities with regards to my own reading of >> electronic literature..... taking Jakobson's discussion of poetics up >> through Darko Suvin's discussion of "cognitive estrangement," and >> looking at the ways that digital literary practices perform a similar >> process with regards to instrumental languages. My thought is that OOO >> is productive in that it asks us to engage in a thought experiment >> about pure objectivitiy, and in doing so, reveals the critical >> necessity of subjective and intersubjective aspects of human being >> that are embedded in our broader assertions about being. I think that >> a lot of the "posthumanisms" try to simply go beyond something that we >> have never understood in the first place: that being human is >> essentially a kind of queer existence, all the much more so when we >> insist that it is not. For my part, I want my human rights. So while >> I am sympathetic, generally, with many of the aims of the >> posthumanists I encounter, I generally think that "Humanism" has yet >> to adequately describe being human. Like Habermas said of modernity, >> it's daunting and messy and incomplete (like most things worth doing). >> Living in Norway right now (moving in a couple weeks, unfortunately), >> humanism seems to be working out pretty well here. The problems of >> the world do not stem from a love of humanity, they stem from our >> growing estrangment from humanity and increased clustering into >> paranoid, exclusionary enclaves (Why do you think everyone watches >> Zombie movies? Blasting away at legions of dirty anthropoidal morons >> trying to eat what you have, a perfect gospel for post democratic >> capitalism). In a world of Darwinian evolution, we are not entirely >> selected, we alter the landscape of an objective process through our >> dialogue with an objective sphere that exists, that we inhabit, and >> that we think about, but which does not simply constitute us. >> >> I admit these thoughts are poorly formed.... and I am very busy these >> days.... so I might not be able to reply as quickly as I would >> normally. But am very interested in these conversations. >> >> Davin >> >> On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 4:16 PM, frederic neyrat <fney...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Hi, >> >> >> I would like - if possible - to get one or two examples about the >> >> objects concerned by your statement:"all objects equally exist, but >> >> not all objects exist equally." I guess - but I just guess - that the >> >> first part of the sentence is ontological and the second part could be >> >> political, but maybe I'm wrong. Thanks in advance. >> >> >> Best, >> >> >> Frederic Neyrat >> >> >> 2012/6/14 Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu>: >> >> Ok, sigh, let me try this again. >> >> >> The "as much as" is not a judgement of value, but of existence. This is the >> >> fundamental disagreement that played out in the comments to Galloway's work >> >> and in the many responses elsewhere. The world is big and contains many >> >> things. I've put this principle thusly: "all objects equally exist, but not >> >> all objects exist equally." >> >> >> It's possible that such a metaphysical position isn't for everyone. But if >> >> your idea of "being political" is as exclusionary and deprecatory as both >> >> Galloway's post and my limited experience thusfar here on empyre, then >> >> perhaps you can explain why that a model worth aspiring for? Why that is >> >> virtuous and righteous? >> >> >> Ian >> >> >> On Jun 14, 2012, at 2:57 PM, Rob Myers wrote: >> >> >> On 06/14/2012 07:02 PM, Ian Bogost wrote: >> >> >> >> As for queer and feminist formulations, I agree with the spirit of what >> >> >> you say, but I'll reiterate my observation that SR/OOO is moving in a >> >> >> slightly different direction—one that concerns toasters and quasars as >> >> >> much as human subjects (note the "as much as" here). Why not take this >> >> >> work for what it is, at least for starters, rather than for what it >> >> >> isn't? >> >> >> >> The "as much as" is precisely the problem. >> >> >> Galloway's critique of OOO that Zach mentioned explains why: >> >> >> http://itself.wordpress.com/2012/06/03/a-response-to-graham-harmans-marginalia-on-radical-thinking/ >> >> >> But I wouldn't lump Meillassoux in with Harman. I think Meillassoux's >> >> philosophy can indeed be interesting for this debate because of its >> >> embracing of contingency and possibility. >> >> >> - Rob. >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> empyre forum >> >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> empyre forum >> >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> empyre forum >> >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> >> _______________________________________________ >> empyre forum >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> empyre forum >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre > _______________________________________________ > empyre forum > empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au > http://www.subtle.net/empyre _______________________________________________ empyre forum empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au http://www.subtle.net/empyre