Hi,
I’ve been thinking of what to do with the EAP work that got discussed both in
the SAAG meeting last time (my drafts), as well on the list. The latter was
more on the EAP-TLS side, and it seems that the discussion has converged to a
reasonable direction recently.
Wondering how we could get the work moving forward. The first thought that came
to my mind was to start a small working group. Thoughts? A very drafty idea of
what it would do is below. Comments appreciated.
————
EAP Maintenance Update (emu)
or
EAP Method Maintenance Update (emmu)
------------------------------------
Chairs:
TBD
Security Area Directors:
Eric Rescorla <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
Kathleen Moriarty <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
Security Area Advisor:
TBD
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General Discussion: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
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Description of Working Group:
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is a network
access authentication framework used, for instance, in 802.11 and VPN
networks and mobile networks. EAP itself is a simple
protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.
Over 50 different EAP methods exist, including several methods
developed in the IETF, and support for EAP exists in a broad set
of different devices. Previous larger EAP-related efforts at the
IETF included rewriting the base EAP protocol documentation and
the development of several standards track EAP methods.
EAP methods are generally based on existing other security
technologies, such as TLS, SIM cards, and various algorithms.
Some of these technologies continue to evolve. And the
understanding of security threats in today's Internet evolves as
well, which has driven some of the evolution in these underlying
technologies. At the same time, some new use cases for EAP have
been identified, such as broader use of EAP in mobile network
authentication.
This working group has been chartered to provide updates to some
commonly used EAP method. Specifically, the working group shall
produce documents to:
- Provide a guidance or update to enable the use of TLS 1.3 in the
context of EAP TLS (RFC 5216). Update the security
considerations relating to EAP TLS, to document the implications
of using new vs. old TLS version, any recently gained new
knowledge on vulnerabilities, and the possible implications of
pervasive survellaince or other new concerns.
- Update the EAP-AKA' specification (RFC 5448) to ensure that its
capability to provide a cryptographic binding to network context
stays in sync with what updates may come to the referenced 3GPP
specifications through the use of EAP in 5G. The specification
should also be updated to define session identifiers for the fast-
re-authentication mode, for which there is an errata against the
existing RFCs.
Also, the group should document any recently gained new
knowledge on vulnerabilities or the possible implications of
pervasive surveillance or other new concerns.
- Develop an extension to EAP-AKA' such that Perfect Forward Secrecy
can be provided. There may also be privacy improvements that
have become feasible with the introduction of recent identity
privacy improvements in 3GPP networks.
- Potentially something else, too, but I have not seen requests
for other things yet. It would be beneficial to keep the WG scope
small.
In all of the above, it is a requirement that none of the updates
break backwards compatibility with existing specifications or
implementations. The current RFCs shall not be obsoleted but
rather updated with either new information or instructions on
what is needed, for instance, to employ a new TLS version.
The working group is expected to stay in close collaboration with
the EAP deployment community, the TLS working group (for EAP-TLS
work), and the 3GPP security architecture group (for EAP-AKA'
work).
Milestones:
TBD
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