On Jan 18, 2020, at 2:20 AM, Ryan Sleevi <ryan-i...@sleevi.com> wrote:
> 
> Or... just stop using those certs/roots already? We’ve already identified 
> that there is absolutely zero reason to do so in the extant status quo, 
> because it still requires manual configuration.

  ... for EAP.  And only for EAP.

  That comment doesn't apply to SMTP, XMPP, IMAP, DNS over TLS, VPNs, RADIUS 
over TLS, etc..  SMTP servers mis-use "WWW" certificates precisely *because* it 
requires zero client configuration.  It leverages an existing trust store to 
increase security.  And that's a good thing.

  As noted by Michael, CAs are using certificates in a way that violates their 
own policy.  The mis-use problem is therefore larger, and worse, than the minor 
issue of EAP *sometimes* using WWW certs.

  My previous messages explained that the common practice for EAP is to use 
private CAs.  For the reasons you outlined above, and more.  Pretty much 
everyone in the EAP community was convinced of this 15+ years ago.  It has been 
standard / recommended practices for 15+ years.

  Finally, there are reasons to use public CAs for EAP.  I have customers who 
do this today, for internal corporate policy reasons.  I've recommended that 
they don't do it, but their internal "security" team over-rules me.

  The rest of your comments are trying to convince people of things that 
they're already convinced of.  We already know this, we already agree (mostly).

  The disagreement is this: your underlying assumption is that these are the 
rules, and they have to be followed.  I believe that this is the IETF, and that 
we make the rules.  If we need to change the rules, then we just do so.  And 
the Internet community has to follow.

  There are details as to which rules apply where, and to who.  But as the 
IETF, we are entirely within our purview to allow the use of id-kp-serverAuth 
in EAP, SMTP, etc..  Or, to come up with a new scheme that replaces 
id-kp-serverAuth.

  If the rules have to be applied strictly, then you have been made aware that 
the CAs you pointed to are violating their own policies.  Therefore, you are 
under a moral obligation to report this mis-use to them.  Failure to do so is a 
tacit admission that you are not applying the rules in practice.  While at the 
same time, claiming that the rules have to be stringently followed.

  Alan DeKok.

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