On Aug 10, 2020, at 11:58 AM, Terry Burton <terry.bur...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Reading "Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3" I find the text potentially
> misleading when it comes to resumption within TLS 1.3, specifically
> for the case where the peer wishes to re-validate the certificate
> originally provided by the server during the initial handshake using
> only its locally cached data and without redoing the handshake, e.g.
> to determine that the original certificate hasn't expired or been
> revoked.

  I suspect that the client needs to cache the server certificate, and 
associate it with the session ticket.  The certificate can then be re-validated 
on fast reconnect.

> 
> 5.7.  Resumption
>   ...
>   To perform resumption in a secure way, the EAP-TLS peer and
>   EAP-TLS server need to be able to securely retrieve authorization
>   information such as certificate chains from the initial full
>   handshake.
>   ...
>   There are two ways to retrieve the cached information from the
>   original full handshake.
>   ...
>   The second method for retrieving cached information is
>   via [RFC5077] or [RFC8446], where the TLS server encapsulates the
>   information into a ticket and sends it to the client.  The client can
>   subsequently do resumption using the obtained ticket.  Note that the
>   client still needs to cache the information locally.

  Hmm... yes, it should be nice to discuss *what* information is cached, and 
why it is cached, and what is done with it to re-validate it.

> In TLS 1.3, the PSK ticket is defined as being encrypted using a key
> that only the server knows. Even without encryption, the format for
> the ticket is opaque to the client with only a suggested format
> presented in RFC 8446.
> 
> How is the original handshake data determined? A casual reading of the
> text seems to imply that the client performs some verification using
> the encapsulated information within the ticket.

  If so, that should be clarified.  The ticket is an opaque blob to the client.

> However I believe that the intent is to use the full PSK blob, or some
> digest thereof, as a key to lookup the corresponding cached handshake
> data.
> 
> Perhaps this could be made clearer?

  I agree.

  Alan DeKok.

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