Hello authors of draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap,
Thanks for working with this draft. Here is a mix of nits/editorials and more
substantial comments in the order as they appear in the draft.
Abstract
OLD
One of the primer goals is to
NEW
One of the main goals is to
Section 1.
"EAP methods transported in CoAP MUST generate cryptographic material
[RFC5247] for this specification. "
The term “cryptographic material” is used multiple times in this document but
is not defined. RFC 5247 uses “keying material”, does that match the intended
meaning?
Section2.
Figure 1 is perhaps too informative containing endpoints, stacks, what is CoAP,
and scope of this document. There is no line/arrow between IoT Device and
Controller, presumably because there is too much other information. Section 2
don’t talk about the stack at all.
* Proposal: Make two figures: one with nodes and lines/arrows (“architecture”);
another with the stack, which is essentially the same in the two nodes in scope
of this document.
* It is confusing that CoAP role allocation is shown in the figure since those
only apply to one step of the operation in section 3.2. In all other steps the
roles are reversed. Proposal: omit the CoAP roles in the figure, and/or provide
an explanation in section text or caption. The section text talking about CoAP
client also needs to be modified accordingly.
* Nit: RFC8323 calls the layer between request/response and reliable transport
“message framing”. Perhaps you want to have a common layer renaming the
"Messages" layer with “Message /framing/”.
Section 3.
"It is RECOMMENDED a light EAP method for the case of constrained link and
constrained IoT devices."
If this will remain a normative recommendation, then there needs to be a
definition (reference) of "light EAP method". Perhaps consider just explain the
intention of "light" ("lightweight"?) and remove the normative recommendation?
---
OLD
The article [eap-framework], highlights the benefits of the EAP
framework.
NEW
The benefits of the EAP framework are highlighted in [eap-framework].
3.1
"resource directory"
Provide a reference or at least as an example, like
draft-ietf-core-resource-directory,
---
OLD
Example of this protocols
NEW
Example of such protocols
3.2
Step 0
"The message also includes an URI in the payload of the message to indicate to
what resource (e.g. '/a/x') the Controller MUST send the first message with the
EAP authentication"
The DoS issues with requiring the Controller to send a message to an unknown
URI need to be considered.
Step 1
"the Sender ID for OSCORE selected by the Controller"
Is this the Sender ID *of the IoT device* selected by the Controller? In other
words, is it the Recipient ID of the Controller selected by the Controller?
That would correspond to how OSCORE identifiers are chosen in EDHOC:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-12#section-3.3.2
Best not to use the terms "SID" or "RID" unqualified in message fields since
they are reversed on the IoT device and Controller. Better use terminology like
e.g. RID-I and RID-C for RID of IoT device and Controller, respectively.
Step 2
"the EAP response, the Recipient ID and the selected ciphersuite for OSCORE are
in the payload."
Is this the Recipient ID *of the IoT device*? See comment above.
---
OLD
In this step, the IoT device MAY create a OSCORE security context with the
Sender ID and Recipient ID.
NEW
In this step, the IoT device MAY create a OSCORE security context with its
Sender ID and Recipient ID.
Step 7
OLD
The reception of the POST message protected with OSCORE using the Sender ID
sent in Step 1 is considered by the IoT device as an alternate indication of
success ([RFC3748]).
The unqualified "Sender ID" is confusing here. Why does the ID sent in step 1
indicate success to the IoT device? I would expect the ID selected by the IoT
device itself and sent in step 2, if used by the Controller to derive the
OSCORE security context to protect the message in step 7 would be a stronger
indication of success. Proposal (check if this is correct):
NEW
The reception of the POST message protected with an OSCORE security context
derived using the Recipient ID of the IoT device sent in Step 2 is considered
by the IoT device as an alternate indication of success ([RFC3748]).
---
"The communication with the last resource (e.g. '/a/w') from this point MUST be
protected with OSCORE except during a new (re)authentication (see Section 3.3)."
I don't understand why there is an exception. OSCORE seems to be applied to
communication with the last resource in all cases:
* In the case of new authentication the procedure explained in Section 3.2
applies protection with OSCORE in communication with the last resource.
* In the case of re-authentication, the procedure is explained in Section 3.3
to be "exactly the same" as in Section 3.2.
Also I find the expression "new (re)authentication" confusing - what is the the
difference between "re-authentication" and "new re-authentication"?
Section 4.
" 1. SID: It contains the Identifier for the Sender ID to be used in
the OSCORE security context.
2. RID: It contains the Identifier for the Recipient to be used in
the OSCORE security context."
Same comment as above to qualify SID and RID: is SID the Sender ID of the IoT
device or of the Controller?
Section 5.1
"If the Controller sends a restricted list
of ciphersuites that is willing to accept, and the ones supported by
the IoT device are not in that list, the IoT device will respond with
a '4.00 Bad Request', expressing in the payload the ciphersuites
supported. "
Make clear (here or in a security consideration) that in case of an error
message containing a cipher suite, the exchange of cipher suites between EAP
authenticator and EAP peer cannot be verified. For example, a man-in-the-middle
could replace cipher suites in either message which would not be noticed if the
protocol is ended after step 2.
Best regards
Göran
From: Ace <[email protected]> on behalf of John Mattsson
<[email protected]>
Date: Monday, 25 October 2021 at 17:03
To: Dan Garcia Carrillo <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>,
EMU WG <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [Ace] [Emu] New Version Notification for
draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap-04.txt
Thanks,
I think this is a very useful mechanism and a well written draft. Some quick
comments.
- "ciphersuite"
Note that both TLS and EDHOC spells this with space "cipher suite"
- Section 2. I don't understand what "SM" in Figure 1 is an abbrevation for.
- Section 2. "UDP/TCP/Websockets" Why is the Websocket protocol in plural?
- Section 3. "EAP method that exports cryptographic material"
This can probably be reformulated in terms of MSK, EMSK or "Key derivation"
which
is the property that RFC 3748 uses.
- "EAP-MD5 cannot be used since it does not export key material"
MD5 should really not be used at all for security resons. Highlighting it
like this might
be the idea that it would be ok if EAP-MD5 had the "Key derivation" property.
- "The required key, the Master Session Key (MSK), will be available once the
EAP authentication is successful."
Does this belong in step 2?
- In Figure 2. I do not think you have to wait until EAP-SUCCES to make MSK
available.
The authentication can be successful before EAP-SUCCES.
- In section 3.3. it might be good to state that "Reauthentication" might be
needed to rekey MSK/EMSK and to increase protection against key leakage.
(An important mitigation of pervasive monitoring is to force attackers to do
dynamic key exfiltration instead of static key exfiltration. Dynamic key
exfiltration increases the risk of discovery for the attacker [RFC7624]. While
OSCORE will soon be augmented with a rekeying mechanism with forward secrecy,
attackers can still get away with doing static key exfiltration. This is
similar to TLS 1.3 with KeyUpdate, after leakage of
application_traffic_secret_N, a passive attacker can passively eavesdrop on all
future application data sent on the connection including application data
encrypted with application_traffic_secret_N+1, application_traffic_secret_N+2,
etc.)
- "4. The values from 65000 to 65535 are reserved for experimentation"
what does "The values" refer to? Lifetime? In that case it would fit better
under 3.
- In addition to AES-CCM-16-64-128, only ciphersuites only cipher suites with
AES-GCM is included. My feeling was that most IoT people are more interested in
ChaCha20-Poly1305 than AES-GCM. I don't have a strong personal opinion.
- "which is considered fresh key material"
“considered fresh”? Maybe "uniformally random"?
- With normal use of DTLS, Appendix A violates “The CoAP-EAP operation is
intended to be compatible with the use of intermediary entities between the IoT
device and the Controller”. This limitation should be clearly stated.
- Probably good if the labels have “CoAP-EAP” in all the labels to guarantee
that they do not collide with anything else.
Cheers,
John
From: Emu <[email protected]> on behalf of Dan Garcia Carrillo
<[email protected]>
Date: Monday, 25 October 2021 at 13:27
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>, EMU WG <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [Emu] New Version Notification for
draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap-04.txt
Dear ACE and EMU WG,
We have submitted a new version of the draft (draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap)
This version provides information on the different comments, from the
reviews and interim meetings.
Best Regards.
El 10/25/2021 a las 1:23 PM, [email protected] escribió:
> A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap-04.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Dan Garcia-Carrillo and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Name: draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap
> Revision: 04
> Title: EAP-based Authentication Service for CoAP
> Document date: 2021-10-25
> Group: ace
> Pages: 29
> URL:
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap-04.txt
> Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap/
> Htmlized:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap
> Diff:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap-04
>
> Abstract:
> This document specifies an authentication service that uses the
> Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) transported employing
> Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) messages. As such, it
> defines an EAP lower layer based on CoAP called CoAP-EAP. One of the
> primer goals is to authenticate a CoAP-enabled IoT device (EAP peer)
> that intends to join a security domain managed by a Controller (EAP
> authenticator). Secondly, it allows deriving key material to protect
> CoAP messages exchanged between them based on Object Security for
> Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE), enabling the establishment
> of a security association between them.
>
>
>
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
>
_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
