Hi everyone, Please find inline our responses to the comments raised. Thank you for your review and feedback. Best regards, The EAP-EDHOC Authors.
Francisco López Gómez Predoctoral Researcher Dept. Ingeniería de la Información y las Comunicaciones [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> [logo UMU]<https://www.um.es> [logo euniwell]<https://www.euniwell.eu/> [logo hr]<https://www.um.es/web/hrs4r> [logo CMN]<https://www.campusmarenostrum.es/> ________________________________ De: Tommy Jensen via Datatracker <[email protected]> Enviado: Miércoles, 29 de Abril de 2026 7:16 Para: The IESG <[email protected]> CC: [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]> Asunto: Tommy Jensen's No Objection on draft-ietf-emu-eap-edhoc-09: (with COMMENT) Tommy Jensen has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-emu-eap-edhoc-09: No Objection When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TNJun2yhs5nnWjCC6d34625j1l08Imu96pQjpEUvI1dC2dDE8Jr4pOsbZyzrgJOK0cMT0K-EUrAlHrrCsey-$ for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emu-eap-edhoc/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TNJun2yhs5nnWjCC6d34625j1l08Imu96pQjpEUvI1dC2dDE8Jr4pOsbZyzrgJOK0cMT0K-EUrAlHn4ah4u1$ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- I support this document as an efficient way to improve the security/performance trade-off for low-resource devices. One point I think should be clarified is this bit from Section 3.1: > Resumption of EAP-EDHOC may be defined using the EDHOC-PSK > authentication method [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc-psk]. ...compared to Section 6.9: > The cross-protocol attack of [RFC9190] does not apply here, as no > resumption mechanism has been defined for EAP-EDHOC. I suggest 6.9 should be updated to more explicitly delegate responsibility to documents that define resumption mechanisms rather than just say it isn't this draft's responsibility. [Authors] Thank you for this comment. Resumption is not defined in the current document, as EDHOC-PSK is still under standardization in LAKE wg. However, in the future, once EDHOC-PSK reaches a stable version, we would like to add a resumption mechanism for EAP-EDHOC, addressing the cross-protocol attack concern at that moment. We will update the text to explicitly delegate responsibility on cross-protocol attacks to the future document defining the resumption mechanism, as suggested. Regarding Section 6.5: > EAP-EDHOC relies on EDHOC, which is designed to encrypt and integrity > protect as much information as possible. Any change in any message > is detected by means of the transcript hashes integrity verification. The statement that EDHOC is designed to "encrypt and integrity protect as much information as possible" (opportunistic) seems to be at odds with "any change in any message" (deterministic). As far as I can tell, the latter claim is true. Therefore, I would change how EDHOC is described here to match that. If in fact there are some changes that can be made to a message that cannot be detected, then the text needs corrected of course. [Authors] Thank you for this suggestion. Since EDHOC uses transcript hashes that include the plaintext messages for key derivation, any modification to a message will result in a mismatch in the keys used to perform the protocol by both parties. Therefore, an attacker cannot introduce unnoticed changes to a message. However, the phrase “protect as much information as possible” is used because not all fields and messages in EDHOC are encrypted. We acknowledge the possible ambiguity in the text, so we will rephrase it as follows: “EAP-EDHOC relies on EDHOC, which is designed to maximize confidentiality by encrypting handshake elements as early as the protocol state permits. In addition, the protocol is cryptographically bound such that any modification to any message—encrypted or unencrypted—results in a verification failure, as transcript hashes computed over the plaintext messages are used to derive the cryptographic material used by both endpoints.”
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