On Fri, 28 Sep 2012 14:37:44 +0900 Cedric BAIL <cedric.b...@free.fr> wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 2:00 PM, Joerg Sonnenberger > <jo...@britannica.bec.de> wrote: > > On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 07:10:29PM +0900, Carsten Haitzler wrote: > >> here's the question... this is pretty lame security-wise. > >> shouldn't we be military/cia/nsa spec and overwrite it at least 7 > >> times? :) oh and this will probably/possible get screwed by > >> logging fs's or flash media that may shuffle the blocks around on > >> write :) ie it wont help. > > > > It's generally lame. Overwriting once with 0s is enough for pretty > > much any basic recovery attempt. Anything involving direct physical > > scans of the disk is *much* harder (if possible at all) to defend > > against. > > With any big new disk, the actual density of information on disk > require to use an atomic force microscope. This means you will have an > insanely high resolution image of your disk. Any movement, at the > atomic level, during the scan will result to have offset and noise. So > your result is an insanely high resolution image where you are trying > to get some information out with a lot of noise in. I am ready to bet > than even the CIA doesn't have access to this kind of technology and > even if they had, the cost of getting that few bytes will be insanely > high and I doubt they will use it instead of more classic coercive > approach. > > The more the time goes, the more we pack information on the same > surface, the less space there is for erased information to survive. Sooner or later the remnants of deleted data mix in with the existing noise enough to become undetectable for any reasonable effort to retrieve it. That's why the specs on this sort of stuff require multiple passes with generally random data. For 99% of needs, the above mentioned atomic force microscope and similar scanning methods are well beyond "reasonable". Chaining people to a chair and thumping their naked genitals with a lead weighed rubber hose is way cheaper. On the other hand, if it was actually *impossible* to defend against, then the NSA would only need one single floppy disk for all their data, since they could read ALL the deleted data on it. It's definitely possible to defend against. For the ultimate protection, melt it down and toss it into a volcano, or other drastic measure. -- A big old stinking pile of genius that no one wants coz there are too many silver coated monkeys in the world.
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