Hmm... I have attempted to stay close to the truth lately in my posts on this Google group. I have (by implied irony and sly humor) sought to raise awareness of things not implicitly stated in my posts, such as the question of what value we should place upon the categorizations of "mental disorders" which are judged to exist by mental health professionals. So the short answer to your question regarding "fact or fancy" is that deceit was not intended with the facts presented, but misunderstanding is possible due to lack of shared cultural and experiential background. In response to your query "manifest or concealed", you will find if you look over my writings upon the internet that although I have jabbed at the "Doctors" from time to time, this recent discussion of my internal mental landscape is new material. Some of it might have been deduced from information in my government dossier, but probably was buried to such an extent that it was definitely concealed and in no way manifest up until now. Bon appetite Spooks Inc.!
Lonnie Courtney Clay On Thursday, June 9, 2011 1:33:40 PM UTC-7, nominal9 wrote: > > Hi Lonnie... same question for you... the things that you sopeak of in > your post... do you yourself think that they are fact or fancy... > manifest or concealed? > > On Jun 8, 9:34 pm, Lonnie Clay <[email protected]> wrote: > > I read the text and examined the diagrams at the link provided below. My > > understanding was limited because I lack the context of Budda's > teachings. > > So I will take a stab at reinventing Budda. > > > > 1) Through introspection, become *aware* of your thought processes, > > following trains of thought from original stimulus down the track of your > > > thoughts, at each stage asking yourself why you thought what you thought, > > > and what was implied by that justification of your thought. Learn to > > recognize cultural conditioning. > > 2) Become *aware* of your senses, starting with low stimulus environments > > > and working towards highly stimulating environments, honing your focus so > > > that you are able to isolate and detect *in context* sensory impressions > > formerly lost in the *noisy* environment. Learn to prioritize sensory > > impressions. > > 3) Exercise your thought tools, in the same manner as a mathematician can > > > derive books full of indeterminate integrals from a few basic rules. In > > other words, develop logical reasoning tools for *learning* the answers > > rather than learning dogmatic answers provided by others. Check yourself > by > > examining the texts of your chosen teachers to see how well your > conclusions > > agree with theirs. BE AWARE that every teacher has their own cultural > > conditioning which only exceptional teachers are able to overcome. You > can > > see their conditioning from the manner in which they *choose* to describe > > > their insightful conclusions, and their chosen tools used to reason > toward > > attaining those conclusions. Learn to detect inconsistencies. > > 4) Develop your own custom brand of thought tools which are most useful > > within your own society. *USE THEM*! See : > https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/epistemology/0dEXdUe4jXQ > > > > Good Luck! > > > > Lonnie Courtney Clay > > > > On Wednesday, June 8, 2011 2:27:42 PM UTC-7, Serenity Smiles wrote: > > > > > I am glad you raised the subject of senses, in buddhism the calculation > of > > > actual senses within the mortal vehicle is 6 but, of course, that is > not > > > the > > > end I submit this article for consideration > > > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayatana. I am interested in how it > compares > > > with a nominalists viewpoint. > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: nominal9 > > > Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2011 9:44 PM > > > To: Epistemology > > > Subject: [epistemology 12116] Re: OT For joke lovers > > > > > So far as universals are concerned regarding the supposed opinions of > > > Nominalists, I claim that universals are convenient for categorizing > > > specifics into sets of similar observables. To the extent that every > > > observation (regardless of how focused) includes the context in which > > > the > > > observation occurs, and the mental status of the observer, there > > > exists a > > > diminishing probability that any observation can be duplicated, even > > > if the > > > observer's attention remains fixed upon an inanimate object. The > > > appearance > > > of duplicated observations is due to insufficient precision of the > > > observation, creating the appearance of identical results. > > > > > Nominalism is a bit "shy" about granting any actual standing to > > > "universals".... beginning Scholasticism dealt in "universals"... then > > > came along William of Ockham... the "first" nominalist....(more or > > > less... mostly more).... > > > Anyway, Ockham says tht Universals do not actually "exist" in > > > reality... but that they are, at best, "abstracted thoughts" regarding > > > very similar (in many Physical senses "clone" identical) particular > > > things..... Ockhams' greatest contribution to Nominalism (to my > > > thinking) was distinguishing between levels of "Intention"... First > > > and Second.... > > >http://www.thefreedictionary.com/First+intention > > > First intention > > > (Logic) a conception of a thing formed by the first or direct > > > application of the mind to the individual object; an idea or image; > > > as, man, stone. > > > > >http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Second+intention > > > Second Intention (Logic) a conception generalized from first > > > intuition or apprehension already formed by the mind; an abstract > > > notion; especially, a classified notion, as species, genus, whiteness. > > > > > Universals are... second intentions.... > > > > > As to your observations about "appearance"... that smacks of what I > > > used to hear was called the "fallibilist" argument... which pretty > > > much amounts to the assertion that "one" can't trust one's own > > > senses.... > > > > >http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Fallibilist > > > Fallibilism (from medieval Latin fallibilis, "liable to err") is the > > > philosophical doctrine that all claims of knowledge could, in > > > principle, be mistaken. Some fallibilists go further, arguing that > > > absolute certainty about knowledge is impossible. As a formal > > > doctrine, it is most strongly associated with Charles Sanders Peirce, > > > John Dewey, and other pragmatists, who use it in their attacks on > > > foundationalism. > > > > > However, it is already present in the views of some ancient > > > philosophers, including Xenophanes, Socrates, and Plato. > > > > > In fact, it had a such a direct philosphical relationship with > > > Pyrrhonistic Skepticism, that Pyrrhonists of history are sometimes > > > referred to as fallibilists, and modern fallibilists as Pyrrhonists.[1] > > > > [2] > > > > > Another proponent of fallibilism is Karl Popper, who builds his theory > > > of knowledge, critical rationalism, on fallibilistic presuppositions. > > > Fallibilism has been employed by Willard Van Orman Quine to attack, > > > among other things, the distinction between analytic and synthetic > > > statements. > > > > > Unlike scepticism, fallibilism does not imply the need to abandon our > > > knowledge - we needn't have logically conclusive justifications for > > > what we know. Rather, it is an admission that, because empirical > > > knowledge can be revised by further observation, any of the things we > > > take as knowledge might possibly turn out to be false. Some > > > fallibilists make an exception for things that are axiomatically true > > > (such as mathematical and logical knowledge). Others remain > > > fallibilists about these as well, on the basis that, even if these > > > axiomatic systems are in a sense infallible, we are still capable of > > > error when working with these systems. The critical rationalist Hans > > > Albert argues that it is impossible to prove any truth with certainty, > > > even in logic and mathematics. This argument is called the > M�nchhausen > > > Trilemma. > > > > > Fallibilism will often discard absolute doctrines such as papal > > > infallibility, claiming that they are merely authority-based > > > arguments. > > > > > My quick reply to "fallibilism is.... That's what measurement or > > > other such observation "tools" are made for.....don't trust your > > > eyes?... get a telescope or a microscope... same goes for other > > > senses... can't remember right?... record it....In other words... you > > > can get around.... "apperances"....not a problem to actual > > > "knowledge"....But the Jack-ass Phenomenologists (like even Kant).... > > > make a big to-do about it..... > > > > > On Jun 8, 12:53 pm, Lonnie Clay <[email protected]> wrote: > > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalism > > > > > > Hmm. I'm glad that we can agree to refrain from combat. Verbal > jousting > > > > becomes tedious after repetition. > > > > > > So far as universals are concerned regarding the supposed opinions of > > > > > Nominalists, I claim that universals are convenient for categorizing > > > > specifics into sets of similar observables. To the extent that every > > > > observation (regardless of how focused) includes the context in which > the > > > > observation occurs, and the mental status of the observer, there > exists a > > > > diminishing probability that any observation can be duplicated, even > if > > > > the > > > > observer's attention remains fixed upon an inanimate object. The > > > > appearance > > > > of duplicated observations is due to insufficient precision of the > > > > observation, creating the appearance of identical results. However, > the > > > > need > > > > to go about one's business makes this irrelevant and a satisfactory > > > > performance of one's tasks can be attained by merely a casual glance > at > > > > most > > > > observables, with the observation filed away along with similar > > > inaccurate > > > > observations in one's memory. If some problem results due to that > casual > > > > approach to life, then and only then do *I* take a closer look to see > > > > what > > > > went awry... > > > > > > I guess that you could say that I am superciliously superficial, > shallow > > > > even... > > > > > > Lonnie Courtney Clay > > > > > > On Wednesday, June 8, 2011 9:23:25 AM UTC-7, nominal9 wrote: > > > > > > > I don't like slinging mud or fighting wars with other posters.... I > > > > > > prefer to reserve my bile and vitriol for "Public figures".... or > > > > > points of argument... > > > > > No need to get personal with me... unless you want to..... > > > > > I like Anarchists.... don't like Libertarians... some say > Libertarians > > > > > are anarchists.... couldn't be farther from the > truth....Libertarians > > > > > like the State, to protect their Contract Rights..... A true > > > > > Anarchist..... thinks a "contract" IS THE STATE..... I prefer > > > > > individual rights... political, human, whatever.... any > encroachment > > > > > on individual rights.....I look at very suspiciously.... > > > > > Ever hear of "Nominalism"... as distinguished from Idealism... > > > > > Realism... or Phenomenology?... that's my take on > > > > > epistemologies....pretty much four branches to it (give or take > > > > > variations in all branches)... I prefer the Nominalist branch, but > I > > > > > think I understand the others well enough.... at least to know what > I > > > > > dislike about them.... > > > > > Nice to meet you, maybe "we" can discuss "things".... without > getting > > > > > "personal".... > > > > > > > On Jun 8, 11:23 am, Lonnie Clay <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/lonnie-courtney-clay/sYe16Qq5iTA > > > > > > > > Perhaps you should read at the link above. I despise > > > > ... > > > > read more » -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/epistemology/-/xQiVvyeQ-I4J. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en.
