Dear Eclipse PMC members, Dear Equinox developers, I am pleased to inform you that the security audit of the recent changes to p2 to support detached signatures has been completed. A report is available for review upon request (limited to PMC members and committers). Mickael Istria and Ed Merks participated in the audit and have seen early and final versions of the report.
There are some findings in the report, and I have created vulnerability issues for the major ones: - https://bugs.eclipse.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=581453 - https://bugs.eclipse.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=581452 - https://bugs.eclipse.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=581451 Note: These issues are only visible to committers until full disclosure. As for the low-risk findings, it is up to the committers and PMC members who request the report to decide whether to create vulnerability tickets or regular issues. The most critical issue identified by the security firm is CVE-2021-41037 ( https://bugs.eclipse.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=577029), which has not seen a fix in the past 2 years. The PMC may want to re-consider this issue. Please let us know the Eclipse project's plan for addressing the 3 major vulnerabilities listed above. Note that the bugs and the report shall be published no later than May 1st, as per the Eclipse Foundation Security Policy (https://www.eclipse.org/security/policy.php). Of course, we can also disclose it earlier at your discretion. Thanks! On Tue, Aug 9, 2022 at 6:08 PM Mikael Barbero < mikael.barb...@eclipse-foundation.org> wrote: > Dear Eclipse PMC members, > > As you may know, the Eclipse Foundation is about to fund a security audit > of the recent changes to p2 to support detached signatures (made to replace > classical jars signing). > > The Eclipse Foundation recognizes the benefits of the new workflow and we > would like to help the project verify that the move from a chain of trust > based on certificates managed by the JRE to a chain of trust based on PGP > did not introduce any flaw in the verification process. Such a flaw could > render users' setup vulnerable to attacks and exploitation of a flaw could > be a hard blow to the Eclipse IDE reputation. > > I will shortly introduce an audit company to the Eclipse p2 committers. I > will do that on the equinox-dev mailing list. I will ask the committers to > help us (the Eclipse Foundation and the audit company) define the exact > scope of the audit. We kindly ask you, members of the Eclipse PMC, your > support with this process. We will especially appreciate your help with > easing the communication between the project and the audit company and as > such, make the audit to be as fruitful as possible. > > FYI, the audit company is OSTIF <https://ostif.org>. They have an > excellent track record > <https://github.com/ostif-org/OSTIF/blob/main/Completed-Engagements.md> in > auditing Open Source projects like OpenSSL or SLF4j. > > Feel free to get back to me if you have any question. > > Thanks. > > > *Mikaël Barbero * > *Head of Security | Eclipse Foundation* > 🐦 @mikbarbero > Eclipse Foundation <http://www.eclipse.org/>: The Platform for Open > Innovation and Collaboration > >
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