Also agree -- look to postal mail for a prime example. When some terrorists started putting poions in packages, there was no initiative to authenticate the sender of any incoming mail. For those institutions where it is warranted, there will always be a sort of airlock, where incoming and outgoing stuff is sanity-checked -- this makes sense whether you are talking about bits and bytes or paper and arbitrary physical containers. By the same token, as large companies realize that their risk is much greater than what they had previously imagined, more of them might decide to afford a similar airlock system. I've read the first part of Richard Feyman's _The Pleasure of Finding Things Out_ where he spoke about the difficulties of communicating with his wife while he first worked with the National Labs, and the "airlock" system with individual review reminds me of that! Good reading, if you're interested. Cheers = )
Ben PS - Freeman Dyson wrote the foreward.... On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 15:53:25 -0800 (PST) Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: | | Completely agree, but I fear this kind of solution is | likely not workable anytime soon (or in our | lifetimes). See the much ballyhooed (sp?) failure and | starts and stops of PKI and the none-ballyhooed but | 10-year old non-starter called DNSSEC. | -- _______________________________________________ EuG-LUG mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://mailman.efn.org/cgi-bin/listinfo/eug-lug
