Jesse Mazer wrote (replying to [EMAIL PROTECTED])
(in the everything mailing list).

>My question for you [hpm] is, does your Platonic view of things 
>rule out the idea 
>of a single global theory of consciousness?  I'm not talking about different 
>Platonic worlds having their own unique definitions of consciousness...if 
>that was true we'd still have the problem of why I'm any less likely to 
>experience the laws of physics suddenly breaking down than I am to 
>experience the world continuing as normal.  We need a truly global, 
>"objective" theory of consciousness to deal with this problem, I think (and 
>possibly a global measure on the space of all possible laws of physics, 
>although not necessarily).

Exactly. I cannot agree more. Actually this is what I (try to) provide
in http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal.

Look in the list archive at: 

   http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1417.html 

for a short 
exposition of the godelian modal logics (G and G*) which gives an embryo
of an objective consciousness theory, and the link with the global
measure problem. 
Consciousness can be  seen as a logical descendant of Consistency. 
It explains why perception can be seen as unconscious (automatic,
instinctive) anticipations, like in Helmholtz's perception theory.

There are two modal logics G and G*. This is Solovay's discovery.
At the propositional level you can axiomatize the  provable
self-referential statements *by* the machine *on* itself (G), but you
can axiomatise also *all* the true statements including 
the non-provable one (G*).

It is the gap between G and G* which makes a theory of qualia
possible. It is the gap between G ang G* which makes possible
the distinction between measuring and feeling, between physical
measurement and physical sensation. (Actually it is the gap between
Z and Z* which play that role, where Z and Z* are intensional variant
of G and G*).

The original paper on G and G* is :
Solovay Robert, "Provability Interpretations of Modal logics" Israel
Journal of Mathematics, 25, 287-304, 1976.


>This shouldn't be so hard to swallow, even for a strict Platonist--after 
>all, we expect the laws of arithmetic to be the same in all possible 
>universes, and I don't really see how something like information theory 
>could change either.  If there's really a theory of consciousness out there, 
>my hope is that it would be similar to information theory, deducible from a 
>few basic first principles which perhaps could be justified on philosophical 
>grounds.

Yes. Although I use more computability theory and provability theory than
information theory, but this one is needed for polishing the approach.

Bruno

PS I send this to the FOR list where there is an interesting discussion
on self-referential statement and  Godel's theorem in relation with 
physics.

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