I guess I'm not too interested in worlds that are not self-observed,
but admit their existence for the sake of various arguments. Clearly
formal systems without concious entities exist in a mathematical sense
- for most purposes, I don't believe it actually matters whether they
physically exist.


> In a message dated 99-10-05 01:45:10 EDT, Russell Standish writes:
> >Hmm... I would for the most part follow the many perspective
> >interpretation, however I consider that perspectives without conscious
> >observers may also be considered to exist, (in as much as they are
> >self-consistent) in that they may be able to be imagined by conscious
> >observers elsewhere in the plenitude.
> A perspective world without a conscious observer, seems to be a contradiction 
> in terms. Yet you make the point that such a world can exist in the 
> imagination of an observer elsewhere in the Plenitude. This world then exists 
> or is simulated or dreamed in the observer's mind and is in fact observed by 
> the observer's mind's eye. Is there an identical world out of his mind and in 
> the Plenitude? If there is, we must go back to Leibniz Identity Principle 
> (LIP). Are the world in the mind and the world in the Plenitude one and the 
> same or are they different?  If they are the same, then in a sense these 
> worlds are observed by the observer's mind's eye. If they are different  then 
> what is the nature of this difference? The difference is not inherent in the 
> worlds themselves. It lies in the presence or absence of a simulating 
> observer, property which is outside these worlds! This is a contradiction. 
> Thus, it appears that the only way out is to accept LIP for this particular 
> case.
> The other case of a perspective world without a conscious observer, and which 
> does not exist in any observer's mind is definitely a contradiction in terms. 
> Such a world is just portion of the Plenitude which is out of reach of 
> consciousness possibly because its inherent self contradictions prevents 
> consciousness from arising within it or from imagining it. Do such worlds 
> exist? In other words are there portions of the Plenitude which are 
> inaccessible? I think that in this case, the verb "to be" loses its meaning 
> and I rather not discuss it further.
> George Levy

Dr. Russell Standish                    Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW                       Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052                             Fax   9385 6965
Australia                               [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Room 2075, Red Centre                   http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks

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