Turing Machines have no real time clock and no interrupt. If we assume the 
comp hypothesis (purely based on Turing machines) and the anthropic 
principle, then the flow of consciousness can only be constrained by the 
logical nature of the links pernitting transitions from one observer moment 
to the next. Time therefore is an illusion derived from such a logical flow.

Having said that, I am puzzled by the fundamental quantization of the world 
and the constancy of Planck's constant everywhere and at all time. To achieve 
such a universal "clock" we could assume:

1) either that at the heart of the comp hypothesis there exist a large number 
of Turing machines all requiring a real time clock responsible for this 
quantization. This implies a weakening of comp and the assumption that time 
is real. I do not favor this explanation.

2) or that all events in our universe share the same (identical) mechanism 
for transition from observer moment to the next. In other words we all 
realized (or simulated) by the same Turing machine (or otherwise equivalent 
CPU). All physical time intervals are defined according to the cycle 
time/interval of this single machine which is generating not just our 
universe, but our Multiverse (all the universes accessible through QM. )
This cycle time corresponds to Planck constant which is absolute in the sense 
that it defines our own frame of reference. So, (relatively speaking,) from 
our point of view it appears to be absolute. From the point of view of an 
observer outside our Multiverse, its actual value could be very small or very 

BTW, the existence of the same types of particles (electrons, photons...) 
across the Multiverse indicate the existence of a common implementation that 
goes beyond just a common Turing machine cycle time. In other words, some of 
the basic software  across the Multiverse is also identical. i.e., the basic 
driver software Version 1.0 for electrons is identical across the Multiverse.

This lead to the possibility that the QM Multiverse < the Plenitude

George Levy

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