Jacques M Mallah: > Um ... what the hell did any of that have to do with immortality? >I'll tell you what - nothing. Only by looking at the measure distribution >can we find out about mortality.
I agree. That is why a computationnalist should define a relative measure distribution on the set of computationnal histories. But once you accept the probability argument of the preceding posts, "immortality" is qualitatively much more plausible than mortality. > That's the crazy claim of you and your allies. I will ask the allies to drop bombs on you until you stop using so poor arguments ... (hum! ;-)). >You know full well >that when I say it's observationally false, I mean the fact that you are >not nearly as old as you should expect. Sorry, I didn't know that. At least it is a clear point. So you accept SSA in the absolute sense of Nick Bostrom. I accept SSA only in the relative and/or conditionnal sense. I don't think it is possible to put a measure on a set : neither of "conscious states" nor even of "observers". You can only put a conditionnal measure on a set of computationnal (including quantum one) continuations from a relative state. With relative SSA, it is not possible to be old without having been young, and this is conform to common sense. For exemple you write also: > Anyway, 4*10^9 years is nothing. If you were really immortal, you >should expect to be a lot older than that. The problem is that ANY finite number is "nothing" compare to infinity. You are saying us that immortal consciousness is in principle impossible because, whatever your age is, you should expect to be much older. I really think that this is not valid : you can easily conceive a "robot" immortal due to intensive care by its human-chain of owners. (Of course, such a robot must have an infinitely extending body to remember an infinitely extending memory of its past, but that is not relevant for the kind of immortality (survival) we talk about). Bruno.