Jacques M Mallah:
>       Um ... what the hell did any of that have to do with immortality?
>I'll tell you what - nothing.  Only by looking at the measure distribution
>can we find out about mortality.

I agree. That is why a computationnalist should define a relative
measure distribution on the set of computationnal histories. But once you 
accept the probability argument of the preceding posts, "immortality" is
qualitatively much more plausible than mortality.

>       That's the crazy claim of you and your allies. 

I will ask the allies to drop bombs on you until you stop using 
so poor arguments ... (hum! ;-)).

>You know full well
>that when I say it's observationally false, I mean the fact that you are
>not nearly as old as you should expect.

Sorry, I didn't know that. At least it is a clear point. So you accept
SSA in the absolute sense of Nick Bostrom.
I accept SSA only in the relative and/or conditionnal sense.
I don't think it is possible to put a measure on a set : neither of 
"conscious states" nor even of "observers". You can only put a
conditionnal measure  on a set of computationnal (including quantum 
one) continuations from a relative state.
With relative SSA, it is not possible to be old without having been
young, and this is conform to common sense.

For exemple you write also:
>       Anyway, 4*10^9 years is nothing.  If you were really immortal, you
>should expect to be a lot older than that.

The problem is that ANY finite number is "nothing" compare 
to infinity. You are saying us that immortal consciousness is in principle
impossible because, whatever your age is, you should expect to be much
older. I really think that this is not valid : you can easily conceive a 
"robot" immortal due to intensive care by its human-chain of owners.
(Of course, such a robot must have an infinitely extending body to 
remember an infinitely extending memory of its past, but that is not 
relevant for the kind of immortality (survival) we talk about).


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