Tomoyuki Tanaka (through Chris Maloney) suggest for the holiday exercice (find a methodological contradiction between Hofstadter and himself in Mind's I): > >P = "the fundamental uncertainty in quantum physics is unrelated > to the mystery of mind". Bravo. A little more precise sentence is (with "not P") not P = "the fundamental indeterminism in quantum physics could be a consequence of the computationalist hypothesis in philosophy of mind". The curious thing is that Hofstadter criticizes Everett MWI by saying it would not explain why we feel that we are in this branche and not in another one (well known critics btw). But in the conversation with Einstein's brain, although he duplicates Einstein's brain, he does not realize that Einstein could have asked the very same question "why am I the one speaking with Achille and not the one speaking with the Tortoise". So if the absence of answer to the question "why we feel that we are in this branche ..." is a critics of MWI, it should be use as a critics of the computationalist hypothese too. This shows that neither Dennett nor Hofstadter seems to have seen the computationalist indeterminism. And of course they have not seen that comp implies a MWI of arithmetics. I agree that this "indeterminism" is first person indeterminism. This first person indeterminism can nevertheless easily be changed into a third person indeterminism by duplicating populations of machines. Bruno
