Okay, but remember that this is a *thought* experiment.  I assume
the existence of a machine that can take an instantaneous
"snapshot" of a person and produce an *exact* duplicate at
another location.  There are two (at least) implicit metaphysical
assumptions here:

  - I assume that the copy will be a fully conscious human, i.e.
    no zombies.  That the copy machine, by virtue of copying the
    physical person, actually copies the person (there is no 
    res-cogitans on which the person depends, which is immune
    from the copy process)

  - Jane's conscious experience can "flow" into either her 
    original or into her copied bodies.  So that from the 
    perspective of "Jane at t1", there is a 1/2 chance she'll
    be Jane1 at t2, and a 1/2 chance she'll be Jane2.  If you
    don't like this, then assume that the original is destroyed
    and that two identical copies are produced.  You still 
    might object that the consciousness can't "jump" across
    an extended space and/or time, and that would be one
    possibility (which I don't think is likely to be true).

Gilles HENRI wrote:
> >Note that one need not bring MWI into this at all.  The only big
> >assumption is the existence of a copy machine.
> Chris, please tell me first exactly what you call a copy machine.
> Gilles

Chris Maloney

"Donuts are so sweet and tasty."
-- Homer Simpson

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