Okay, but remember that this is a *thought* experiment. I assume
the existence of a machine that can take an instantaneous
"snapshot" of a person and produce an *exact* duplicate at
another location. There are two (at least) implicit metaphysical
- I assume that the copy will be a fully conscious human, i.e.
no zombies. That the copy machine, by virtue of copying the
physical person, actually copies the person (there is no
res-cogitans on which the person depends, which is immune
from the copy process)
- Jane's conscious experience can "flow" into either her
original or into her copied bodies. So that from the
perspective of "Jane at t1", there is a 1/2 chance she'll
be Jane1 at t2, and a 1/2 chance she'll be Jane2. If you
don't like this, then assume that the original is destroyed
and that two identical copies are produced. You still
might object that the consciousness can't "jump" across
an extended space and/or time, and that would be one
possibility (which I don't think is likely to be true).
Gilles HENRI wrote:
> >Note that one need not bring MWI into this at all. The only big
> >assumption is the existence of a copy machine.
> Chris, please tell me first exactly what you call a copy machine.
"Donuts are so sweet and tasty."
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