Hans Moravec, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, writes: > Christopher Maloney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > If our tools were sophisticated enough, we could figure out what > > that creature was experiencing at that moment, independent of his or > > her report. > > NO! We may determine the full physical structure of an organism well > enough to simulate it faithfully as a purely physical object. > > However, any experiences we impute to it will remain a subjective > matter with different answers for different observers. Some observers > will be content to say there are no experiences in any case, including > when they simulate you or me.
In trying to understand these ideas, I have a question. Earlier I think Hans said that one possible observer was the conscious entity himself. I am an observer of my own consciousness. My consciousness (or lack thereof) is subjective, and varies depending on the observer, but one of the observers is me. Does this mean that there is a special consciousness, which is that consciousness observed by the observer himself? In other words, I may impute a certain consciousness to Hans, and someone else may interpret his actions as caused by a different consciousness, but Hans himself interprets his consciousness in a certain way as well. Does this self-interpretation have a privileged position, and if so could we choose to say that it is the "true" consciousness of Hans himself? Hal