>> Why assume non-computable stuff without compelling reason?
>> Shaved by Occam's razor.


>On the contrary.  Why assume the lack of *any* given type of
>mathematical stucture?  A true everything-hypothesis surely would not.
>Occam's razor says: don't add extra distinctions such as a restriction
>like that.

>Note also that, as I said, computability isn't the real issue.  A
>Turing machine can not be a continuous (but computable) structure.  Of
>course the non-computable stuctures should exist too in an everything -

The "non-computable structures" are just an ill-defined fidget of our
imagination. They do not exist in the sense that we cannot formally
describe them with a finite number of bits.  Textbooks and theorems about
real numbers are computable (finite symbol strings, finite proofs), most
real numbers are not.

Occam's razor really says: do not add any bits beyond those necessary
to explain the data. Observed data does not require more than a finite
number of bits, and never will. 

Non-computability is not a restriction. It is an unnecessary extension
that greatly complicates things, so much that we cannot even talk about 
it in a formal way.

Juergen Schmidhuber                                      www.idsia.ch

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