Can you subscribe me so I can contribute but not send me stuff? I get it through another address.
> -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 1999 6:40 AM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Marchal Thesis > > Bruno Marchal's paper, > Computation, Physis and Cognition > > English translation 1st draft > > Introduction > > The computationalist hypothesis, or more simply, > *mechanism*, which I consider here, is the > hypothesis according to which *I* am a machine or > *you* are a machine. The precise way in which I > am interested in the hypothesis that we can > survive, not just with an artificial heart or kidney, > etc., but also with an artificial digital brain (finitely > describable) assuming it is suitably configured at > an adequate level. > The aim is not to defend this hypothesis but to > examine the consequences, notably concerning > the mind-body problem. > In particular I shall show, contrary to a very > widespread belief, among philosophers and > doctors as much as the layman, that mechanism is > incompatible with materialism. > I will demonstrate that mechanism is incompatible > with materialist monism, which claims that is only > one universe, which can in principle be described > entirely in terms of physics. On the way I will > demonstrate that mchanism is also incompatible > with dualism, which holds that there is > simultaneously a tangible world (described by > physics) and a mental world. > Hence I will show that mechanism necessitates a > monist idealism incompatible with any form of > materialism. This proof will not resolve the mind- > body problem, but will lead towards a new > formulation of the question. Essentially, with the > computationalist hypothesis, the mind-body > problem is transformed in the research deriving: > 1. a phenomenology of mind - capable of > explaining the origin and nature of knowledge and > belief; and > 2. a phenomenology of matter, capable of > explaining the origin and nature of our > observations and our theories of physics. > The first point can hardly be considered original. > With computationalism, psychology is, *in > principle*, trivially reduced to information theory. > The originality is in the demonstration that to > resolve the body-mind problem, one is obliged to > derive the phenomenology of matter from the > phenomenology of mind. That is, physics is *in > principle* a branch of psychology. > This is precisely the reverse of our usual attempts > to reduce or try to understand psychological > phenomena from the substrate of the brain - > physical, or even cosmic or universal. > On the contrary, mechanism demands a > psychology which eliminates all materialist > ontology rather than a materialism which > eliminates mental ontology. > Mechanism therefore requires us to consider > physics as a branch of psychology, itself a branch > of information theory, which is in turn a branch of > number theory. The word, "branch" is used here in > a slightly more general sense than normal; this will > be clarified during the course of the proof. > An attentive logician will note that matter is not > *logically* eliminated. But he would fail at any > attempt to explain physical sensations through > physical science alone. > There is a certain irony in this situation. > Mechanism is generally invoked by reductionist > materialists to debunk the spirit and to counter > dualism and other spiritualism. And it works in > practice, but on closer examination (as proposed > here), the dematerialisation does not stop with the > spirit but extends to the body, matter and the > universe. > This work is not speculative. It stands up well to > demonstration or hypothetico-deductive argument: > IF mechanism is true THEN physics *must* be > derived from psychology. I clarify this point in > Chapter 2. > > Note on methodology > To help the reader keep track of the proof, I > decided to be as brief as possible. The poof, which > starts in Chapter 3, finishes by the end of Chapter > 4. It does not assume any specific knowledge, > except a familiarity with Church's Thesis and, of > course, a smattering of high-school classical > philosopy (good treatments are given in Huisman > and Vergez, 1996 or Nagel, 1987). Appendix D > provides an introduction to the mind-body problem > as well as some supplementry definitions on the > concept of sufficient conditions for mechanism. > Chapter 1, which defines the hypotheses of the > *entire* work, raises some technical points which > are not ued in the proof. This additional material > will be used before Chapter 5. > Chapter 5 examines the search for a solution to > the mind-body problem in the light of the proof > given here. Unlike the proof, this research has a > few prerequisite techniques. You may consult the > technical report (Marchal, 1995) or the appendices > of this paper, or certain works such as Boolos, > 1995, Webb, 1980, as well as Albert, 1992 and > Maudlin, 1994 on physics.
