George Levy wrote:

> I think that measure of self is always the same as observed by the self,
> independently of the observer's frame of reference. .. just like the speed of
> light.

I just want to continue the train of thought about measure and perform a type of UD
experiment that Bruno has been talking about to show that the constancy of measure as
seen from the first person perspective is a reasonable hypothesis.

Many years ago I read about a parachutist whose parachute had not fully open. He was
saved by a fluky combination of circumstances. He happened to land through a  tree and
on the ground covered with a deep layer of snow. He got away with some broken bones,
but remained alive. I don't remember his exact name but suffice it to say, for our
thought experiment that we now live in a subset S1 of the branching pattern (in the
plenitude) in which those unlikely events took place. Let the set of  "other" branches
in which the man died be named S0.

>From a third person point of view ( a la Jacques Mallah for example) the number of
branches in S0 are more numerouse than the number of branches in S1. Hence measure M0>
M1.

Now lets examine the converse situation. Another man jumps in a parachute, the
parachute does not open and the man dies. This event is unlikely but has occured a few
times. There are worlds in the plenitude where this man lives, but not in our world.
He is dead. These other worlds are extremely unlikely for they must include a rare
combination of circumstances (tree, snow, water, partially opened parachute, etc) Let
the worlds where this man lives be the set of branches S2.

Clearly from the third person perspective, the number of branches in S2 is much
smaller than the number of branches in S1. Hence M2<M1

Therefore we have the third person perspective of measure

    M2<M1<M0

Yet the worlds S0, S1, S2, are all physically speaking identical except for the
existence or non existence of one person. The laws of physics are the same.

Now let's take a step back and replace the very emotionally charged facts of seeing a
man live or die after a parachute jump by simple "inorganic" facts, millions and
millions of them which characterize each branch in the plenitude. The important thing
to keep in mind is that none of these facts are privileged. The are just random
branching outcomes that affect the history of the observer without directly affecting
his life. There is no reason why these unprivileged facts should affect the first
person measure of the world.

Now here is my relativistic assumption:
If an observer located in S0 attempts to measure M0 (number of branches corresponding
to S0), he would find the same number as an observer in  S1 attempting to measure M1
and as an observer in S2 attempting to measure M2 - Reason: the laws of physics are
the same. The only difference between these worlds are facts which do not affect the
existence of the observer. These facts only affect the history of the world that he
can observe.


George


Reply via email to