Jacques Mallah wrote:

>>The key number of existence is 24. >Do you mean 42? No, I mean 24. As a Carroll fan I can appreciate 42, but that's nothing compare to 24. ... and the 24th root of unity ! >What's a consistent computational extension? Take an incomplete theory T. Suppose that -p is not provable in the theory, then you can add p, as new axiom, without being able to prove -p. This means p is consistent with the theory. In particular the theory T+p is a consistent extension of the theory T. Now a consistent computational extension is a consistent extension where p is DU-accessible. p is generated by a computation. It will be translated (in arithmetic) by -Bew(-p) with p sigma_1. >> >You need to realize that the notion of "1st person" used on this list is >>just an extra-crackpot version of mind-like hidden variables that has no >>basis in objective reality: >> >>Refer me to a post where "1st person" is used as mind-like >>hidden variables. > > Look it up in the archives and find any post that includes the term, >that's one. I'm afraid you have hallucination. What kind of pot are you smoking? I don't see any "1st person" occurence used as a mind-like hidden variables. > You still owe me a >definition of "existence" so I'm not going to define that. Do you agree there is no bigger prime number ? If you agree it means you can understand what I mean by the existence of a number and by the non existence of a number. "other" form of existence will appear in the talk of some machines ... >> > That's not an objective measure distribution if it depends >> >on you... >> >>Let us say it is conditionalised by "me" (my history). > > Well ... (flipping a coin*) ... no, let's not say that. >[* ==> a joke, in response to a ridiculous statement] OK jacques, you got the point. From now on I will say that there is an objective measure distribution. It is no more relative than the square of the PSI function apply to an Everett Relative State. And after all, that is what I am getting to. > No. First, I was using your definition of what distinguishes people, >not my own. I certainly wouldn't want to be the same person as you. I was using yours! >(Non-humans get included too, so what you are saying is that there is only >one person in the multiverse. I do distinguish persons by their memories, when they have distinguishable memories. >I don't think a QTIer has in mind "survival" >via his children, without his old memories, though, so I think no one would >agree with that definition.) Perhaps we are immortals for more than one reason. > Second, I would define "immortal" not as having no end, but as having an >infinite median age over the measure distribution. Thus an exponentially >decaying long-time tail is not immortality. With this definition, well, the problem is quite open ... >Third, as you know I agree with >the (modified for what we know) Doomsday argument, so even collectively >humanity is not immortal. I don't know. >It's basically the same argument as for an >individual. I agree essentially. Bruno