George Levy wrote:
> > Example: a never ending universe history h is computed by a finite
> > nonhalting program p. To simulate randomness and noise etc, p invokes a
> > short pseudorandom generator subroutine q which also never halts. The
> > n-th pseudorandom event of history h is based on q's  n-th output bit
> > q(n) which is initialized by 0 and set to 1 as soon as the n-th element
> > of an ordered list of all possible program prefixes halts.  Whenever q
> > modifies some q(n) that was already used in the previous computation of
> > h, p appropriately recomputes h since the n-th pseudorandom event.
> >
> > Such a virtual reality or universe is perfectly well-defined.
> Such a universe would violate Bell' inequality theorem. Quantum randomness
> cannot be simulated by hidden variables. We have to move beyond
> get a model of objective reality we must first develop a
> model of consciousness.
> George

I disagree. Hidden variables are indeed excluded, but that doesn't mean that
deterministic models proposed by Jürgen or 't Hooft are in conflict with
Bell's theorem. In the case of the model proposed by 't Hooft, you have a
universe that is very chaotic. Quantum mechanics arises in a statistical
description of the theory. Particles such as electrons, photons etc. don't
describe the degrees of freedom of the original deterministic theory, but
rather they arise only in the statistical description of this theory. In
other words: Mach was right in not believing that atoms exist.

In the case of the two slits experiment,
a hidden variable theory would tell you through what particular slit an
elecron travelled, and this is not possible. Okay, but does the electron
exist in the first place? I think not. The electron is just a mathematical
tool that allows you to calculate probabilities and is unphysical, just like
virtual particles and ghosts in Feynman diagrams. Why believe in electrons,
but not in the Fadeev-Popov ghost?


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