Wei writes, quoting Hal
> > In general, one might expect those minds with less observational power
> > and less specific knowledge and understanding of the universe to have
> > larger measure.
>
> Yes, but that doesn't mean you should be surprised if you find yourself
> having more observational power and more knowledge, because the set of
> sharp minds can have greater measure than the set of dull minds even if
> individual sharp minds has less measure than individual dull minds.
>
> > Does this have any implications for the use of the all-universe hypothesis
> > to explain and predict our observations?
>
> What kinds of implications did you have in mind?

What is the right question to ask in terms of relating measure of an
observer-moment to our likelihood of experiencing it?  Equivalently,
what can we hope to explain via the concept of observer-moments that
vary in measure?

It seems that the general statement that we would expect to be in a
high-measure observer-moment is not true, if the number of low-measure
observer moments is high.  We are not more likely to live in a simple
universe than in a complex one, if the number of possible complex
universes is correspondingly larger.  And the larger number seems
plausible when there is greater complexity, as in the example above of
more complex minds existing in higher numbers.

Hence the all universe principle does not easily explain the absence of
flying rabbits, because while flying-rabbit universes are more complex
and of lower measure, there are so many more ways to come up with complex
universes.  It seems that the explanatory power of the principle is less
than I had realized.

Hal

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