Nick Bostrom writes:

> Hal wrote:
>
> >I wonder if you consider the possibility that there is no matter of fact
> >as to whether we are living in a simulation?  Suppose that we live in real
> >life, and also get simulated one or more times, then our consciousness
> >cannot be localized to any specific instantiation.
>
> A brain (or a particular simulation of a brain) can refer indexically to 
> itself. Suppose you have two brains, A and B, in exactly the same internal 
> states, both of whom think of themselves that they are in a red box. 
> Suppose A is in a red box and B is in a blue box. Then A has a true belief 
> and B has a false belief, and there seems to be an objective fact of the 
> matter that this is so.

I don't think it is right to say that a brain has beliefs.  It seems to me
that beliefs are a property of a mind.  Saying that a brain has beliefs
is a shorthand for saying that the brain instantiates a conscious program,
and that the consciousness has beliefs.

In this case then we would say that the consciousness believes that it
is in a red box.  More precisely, it would believe that the brain which
instantiates it is in a red box.  But "the brain which instantiates it"
is not well defined, since two brains instantiate it.

Hal

Reply via email to