On Wed, Dec 19, 2001 at 09:39:09AM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > This suggests that the simplicity explanation against flying-rabbit > universes is not strong, because the total collection of flying-rabbit > universes is close in measure to the simple universe to which they > rerpesent exceptions. That's the problem as I see it.
If by flying-rabbit you mean any deviation from simplicity, then I agree with you. Notice that our own universe is full of quantum randomness, but we don't see any pattern to the randomness. Similarly, an observer in a Conway's life universe may observe these anomolies that you described, but most observers would perceive them as random fluctuations rather than flying rabbits. The universes where the deviations form patterns meaningful to their observers would collectively have a very small measure compared to the universes where the deviations are perceived as random, because in the former case the programs to generate the meaningful deviations would have to contain information about what kinds of deviations would be meaningful to the observers, and that would make them much longer than programs that simply generate random deviations.