Hi Scerir. Thanks for your explanation of Godel's theorem.
> Goedel's argument does not prove the existence of absolutely
> unprovable (arithmetical) truths.
> Its conclusion is relative to some first-order axiom system
> (of elementary arithmetic), and proves only that there is a true
> proposition unprovable in that system.
> But there are plenty of other systems in wich that proposition
> is provable (mechanically too).
If we exclude ourselves from the part of the universe we attempt to
simulate, I think we can avoid the self-referential paradox brought up by
Godel. This is probably okay for simulating unconscious phenomena, like in
physics or biology or engineering. But if we include our consciousness in
the simulation, I imagine we would surely have a problem describing our
thought processes, especially the thought of how to simulate the thought
> The existence of a proposition unprovable in a given system
> requires, also, that the system is consistent.
I am indeed assuming the universe is consistent.
> But how is a computer supposed to know that?
> Does the universe know Goedel's theorems?
> - Scerir
Well, we know Goedels' theorem, so if we include our knowledge into the
universe simulation, then we have this barrier.
Despite this, Godel does not bar us from stumbling upon a truth without