Finney wrote: >Marchal writes: >> Here is question 6. Perhaps the first not so obvious one. >> Do you agree that, if I ask you at Brussels, before the >> Washington-Moscow duplication experiment: "Where will you *feel* >> to be after the experiment will be completed?" that although >> you can answer "you will see me at Washington and at Moscow", >> your first person diary will either contain "I am at Moscow" or >> I am at Washington" so that you cannot predict with certainty >> where you will feel to be?" > >I don't think this is a meaningful question, because it is not >"operational", that is, it is just a matter of opinion and does not >require anyone to take any action. > >Suppose you were French and, faced with this experiment, you were asked, >would you study English or Russian prior to engaging in this experiment? >That is an operational question. If you think you will be in Moscow, >you would study Russian; if Washington, English. If neither, then I >suppose you would not study either one. For me, I would study both. > >However I would refuse to answer a question like "where will you feel to >be", not because I can't predict the answer with certainty, but because >I don't think "you" is a well defined concept in the context of this >experiment. It's not that the answer to the question is unpredictable, >it's that the question is meaningless.
If you answer "yes" to the question 5 (do you survive duplication) it seems to me that the question is meaningful. After all if "I" survive (in grand-mother sense), it is natural to ask myself where I will feel to be. I don't see the difference whith the experience where I ask you to look at a photon in the superposition state a + b, and asking you to go in W if you find the photon in state a, and to go at Moscow if you find the photon in state b. Here too there is a sense to ask you where you will feel to be, and with MWI both alternatives are realised. Bruno