Russell Standish wrote: >> I still believe my general remarks apply to your "why Occam's razor". >> (I reprint it and I will reread it once I have more time). >> You put to much for me in the hypothesis. Like all physicists you seem >> not to be aware of the mind body problem. > >You are right! What is the mind-body problem?
I appreciate your frankness! Note that I consider sometimes the UDA as a mean to explain that the mind-body problem is NOT solved automaticaly by COMP (as most materialist believes). The formulation of the mind body problem is dependent of the philosophy you believe in. Well, if you believe in a "causal material world", and if you believe in mental sensations and volitions, then the mind-body problem is just the search for an explanation of the link between that causal material world and these mental (subjective, first person) sensations and volitions. A neurophysiologist poetical version is "how can grey matter produces feeling of color". Another one is "how can just firing of neurons produces feeling of joy or of pain". Etc. An idealist (immaterialist) philosopher must explain the belief in matter. A materialist must explain the belief in beliefs. A cartesian dualist must explain the link between matter and belief (or feeling of belief). Some scientist dismiss it as a non scientific problem. It is easy to show that this dismiss is itself not scientific. Our culture is used to put the mind-body problem in religious matter. You can consider the UDA as a reduction of the mind body problem into the problem of the origin of (the belief in) physical laws. And you can see my UTM interview as a solution of the mind body problem (!). The qualia (internal immediate feelings) appears naturaly thanks to incompleteness, or, more precisely, thanks to the difference between Z1 and Z1* (which itself is inherited from the gap between G and G*). More on this latter. Bruno