Charles Goodwin wrote >> From: Jesse Mazer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] >> >> Well, I hope you'd agree that which observer-moment I am >> right now is not a >> "matter of definition," but a matter of fact. My opinion is >> that the global >> measure on all observer-moments is not telling us something >> like the "number >> of physical instantiations" of each one, but rather the >> probability of >> *being* one particular observer-moment vs. some other one. I would be >> interested to hear what you think the measure means, though, since my >> version seems to require first-person facts which are separate from >> third-person facts (i.e., which observer-moment *I* am). > >I don't see how you can talk about the "probability of being a particular >observer moment". The probability is 1 at that moment! We >don't get dropped into observer moments from some metaphysical realm (like >Fred Hoyle's flashlight-and-pigeonholes analogy in >"October the 1st is too late") - we ARE those observer moments. It's a bit >like the probability of me being born as me. The >probability was 1, because otherwise I wouldn't be me! Similarly for this >particular observer moment.
So the question is "knowing that I am living (1-person view) this observer-moment, what can I expect (immediately)? The answer will be given by a measure on the 1- observer-moment described in some 3-person view. My feeling is that Charles and Jesse agree here. Unlike Jacques Mallah, but like Charles, I cannot give meaning to an absolute a priori probability on "observer-moment", but I can give, like Jesse conditional or relative probabilities. This is because the constraint of theoretical computer science are enough for isolating natural nearness relations bearing on computational states and histories. I agree with Jesse that my actual observer-moment is not a matter of definition. Nor will I appreciate, if I ask my doctor if there is a high chance of surviving a delicate operation, that he answers me that it is a matter of definition. Bruno
