>For the computationalist that simple explanation is not available.
>For an explanation that "preparing coffee" augment the degree of
>plausibility  (probability, credibility) of the experience of
>drinking coffee, the only way is to isolate, from pure arithmetics,
>a measure on the consistent computational extensions of my preparing
>coffee-state-history and to show that in most of them (in a sense
>which need to be define also purely arithmeticaly) I will be
>drinking coffee. Slurp. (I'm definitely drinking coffee now!).
>Put in another way, we must derive the laws of physics from
>computer science. And, through the role of the notion of 1-pov,
>we must derive physical belief from coherent discourse by machines,
>or more simply derive physics from (machine) psychology.
>Do you agree?

>From some of Joel's other comments I get the feeling that he's one of those 
who doesn't believe in putting a measure on the set of all possible events, 
whether it's a universal measure (the absolute probability that one set of 
events will be experienced vs. some other) or an observer-relative measure 
(the first-person probability that *I* will experience some future state, 
given my current state). Is this correct, Joel?

Personally, I've never been able to understand the attitude of the 
anti-measurists--how can anything make sense without one? What possible 
reason would I have to believe that the future will resemble the past in any 
way whatsoever? After all, there are an infinite number of possible 
universes that resemble the one I've experienced up to the present moment, 
and then suddenly transform into a swarm of white rabbits--should I be 
bracing myself for such a possibility at every moment? Without some kind of 
measure on the Plenitude we cannot even talk about the "probability" that 
the laws of physics will continue to operate normally a minute from 
now...you can't really talk about anything but the present moment, in fact.
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