Hal finney wrote:

>It makes more sense to think of mind as a relational phenomenon, like
>"greater than" or "next to", but enormously more complicated.  In that
>sense, if there are two identical brains, then they both exhibit the
>same relational properties.  That means that the mind is the same in
>both brains.  It's not that there are two minds each located in a brain,
>but rather that all copies of that brain implement the mind.
>
>Further support for this model can be found by considering things from
>the point of view of that mind.  

                               <relief!>

>Let it consider the question, which
>brain am I in at this time?  Which location in the universe do I occupy?
>There is no way for the mind to give a meaningful, unique response to
>this question.  It does not occupy just one brain or just one location.
>Any answer will be both wrong and right.
>
>In this model, if the number of brains increases or decreases, the mind
>will not notice, it will not feel a change.  In fact, it has no way
>of telling.  No introspection will reveal the number of implementations
>of itself that exist in a universe or a multiverse.  (Possibly it can
>tell that there are more than zero implementations, but even that will
>be questioned by some.)


I do supporte a similar view of course. 
I argued, through comp, for zero *physical*
implementations and a continua (uncountable) of "normal" slightly 
differentiating experiences of consistent extensions.
We can attach a mind to a relatively apparent consistent machine,
(perhaps even just by sort of turing-politeness), but we cannot attach
*a* (one) machine, nor any singular description to "a" mind.
The mind body problem is not *that* easy. Indeed.


Jacques Mallah wrote:


>The problem comes when some people consider death in this context.  I'll 
>try to explain the insane view on this, but since I am not myself insane I 
>will probably not do so to the satisfaction of those that are.


First theorem in machine psychology: any machine knowing its own 
consistency
(non insanity ?) is inconsistent.    ([]<>t & <>t)  ->  []f

This is not only true (theorem of G*), but any consistent machine can
know that ("arithmeticaly true" theorem of G).


Bruno

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