Saibal Mitra wrote:
> Yes, you can save the ``conventional´´ quantum immortality theorem by
> extending the definition of a person, but is a person with an astronomical
> amount of data stored in his brain plus all of my memory really me? I would
> say not.

If that person remembers being you at an earlier age then I would say
yes - it is the same person. It is following conventional usage. Why
shouldn't the $60million man still be the same person after his
prosthetics operations?

> I would go even further: The person I was when I was 3 years old is dead. He
> died because too much new information was added to his brain.

This view would align you with Jacques Mallah and James Higgo with
their "observer moment" view of reality. I have expressed my many
disagreements with this approach in the everything list - its not an
easy position to counter.

> A different version of quantum immortality is more reasonable (meaning that
> it has a much higher probability than the conventional version). The process
> of death necessarily involves the destruction of the brain. The dying person
> thus looses information. At a certain point the information that he is dying
> is lost to the person. At that time the information still present in the
> brain will be exactly identical to the information present in another
> person's brain somewhere else in the multiverse. Let's call him X. There
> will be an infinite number of X's
> There is then a high probability that X is not dying, that in fact he is
> almost identical to the original person at a younger age. The dying person
> thus walks away in X's body.
> Saibal

Interesting scenario - but I suspect you would be walking away in
worm's body. Hey perhaps the Bhuddists are right about reincarnation
after all!

Dr. Russell Standish                     Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967                    
UNSW SYDNEY 2052                         Fax   9385 6965                    
Australia                                [EMAIL PROTECTED]             
Room 2075, Red Centre          

Reply via email to