Wei Dai Wrote
>On Sat, Dec 08, 2001 at 12:57:16PM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>> For example, suppose he took a drug which made his mental processes
>> become confused. He was no longer sure of basic facts about himself
>> and the universe. This mental state would no longer be bound to one
>> specific universe. Instead, a large collection of distinct universes
>> could be consistent with this mental state. These observer-moments
>> might therefore have larger measure, since they would correspond to a
>> larger part of the multiverse.
>I think this is a common occurance. Every time you forget something,
>a post-forgetting observer-moment would have larger measure than a
>pre-forgetting observer-moment. And similarly, every time you observe
>something new, a post-observation observer-moment would have smaller
>measure than a pre-observation observer-moment.
Not necessarily so because the set of accessible observer moments can
be infinite. I agree in principle that a post-forgetting observer-moment
should have larger measure than a pre-forgetting observer-moment (note
this entails, in some sense QTI and/or COMPI).
But post observations lead to continua of extensions (most
undistinguishable), so that acquiring informations does not make
the measure smaller, even if it diminish the set of consistent extensions.
In an older post Wei Dai wrote
>> Nick Bostrom wrote:
>> Hmm. Would you say the analogous thing about temporally distinct but
>> qualitatively identical observations of the same person? Say, you wake up
>> first at 7 am for one minute and again at 8 am for another minute. Suppose
>> you know all along that you will awake on these two occasions and that both
>> times you will be in the same conscious state of thinking "It is 7 am now."
>> It would seem natural to say that the first time you awoke, you were right
>> and the second time you were wrong. Suppose a little later you look at the
>> clock and it says "8:01". Mightn't you then say to yourself "Gee! When just
>> a second ago I just thought it was 7 I was badly mistaken!"
>I would say that I was wrong both times, in the sense that both instances
>of the belief "It is 7 am now" are unjustified. The correct belief is "It
>may be 7 am or 8 am now", or "There are two brain instances implementing
>my thoughts, one at 7 am and another one at 8 am."
I don't understand. Only some relative correctness
should be genuine imo, especially for decision.