Brett Hall wrote:

>There is a difference between saying "The existence of the physical world 
>is certain (i.e: we can prove it)" and "I believe that the physical world 
>This is analagous to our trust in the laws of physics we can hold the 
>belief that "Quantum Theory is a true description of reality" - without 
>being absolutely certain that it is infallible. It's for this reason we 
>don't 'stay in bed' as you say. A fallibalist does not say "I can prove 
>Physical Reality doesn't exist" -  the fallibalist has the belief that we 
>can be skeptical about everything. I think a pretty good starting point is 
>to assume that physical reality exists and obeys physical laws (I think 
>this is different to the philosophy of Bruno) - but I'm not about to say 
>that my opinion in this matter is a demonstrable certainty.
>  ----- Original Message ----- 
>  [Gordon]Just to add it still does not get away from the Non-physical at
>  least the Physical has something to start with,where in the past when
>  Philosophy and old QT talk of the non-physical it got us know where and
>  if we took it totally nothing would have got done instead we believe in
>  the Fantasy and things got done and later discovered Comp through this
>  Physical theory so I thing right or wrong it has a lot more to tell us
>  then just saying it not there and staying in bed.

The problem is the ambiguity of the expression "physical reality exists 
and obeys physical laws".

I for sure bet physical reality exists and obeys physical laws.

At least in *some* sense for I wouldn't try to extract that "physical
reality (including the laws)" from number's psychology if I was not 
believing in those physical reality-laws first.

I just ask where those physical laws (and sensations) come from, and 
I give an argument (UDA) showing that: 
  IF it exist a level such that  *I* remain invariant
through a digitalisable functional substitution (+ Church Thesis, + 
a minimal amount of arithmetical platonism = comp), 
  THEN, in short, the physical laws are *necessarily* given by a sort 
of modal summation on arithmetical self consistent extensions.
In a second step thanks to recursion theory and provability logic (two
children of Post Godel Turing ...), which are really the modern science 
of "I", I extract the logical structure of the UM possible physical 
propositions. Sometimes I just say that I interview some Sound
Universal Machine (SUM) asking her about those consistent extensions.
It is a purely Arithmetical version of UDA. My thesis = UDA + AUDA.
UDA and AUDA can be understood separately, but both are more
persuasive taken together. AUDA needs familiarity with logic.

The future should show if we get the Quantum or Something Else, and 
the future should confirm the quantum or something else.
I mean in the long run comp could be falsifiate, giving the wrong
mass for some bosons. Well, for now I got just a promising (imo)
arithmetical orthologic. It is still an open question if a
Universal Quantum Machines lives there. What is nice is that such
question can be at least precisely formulate.
(Gordon, I'm not staying in bed! :)


UDA links:


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