Russell Standish wrote: >Ah! You mean the problem of consciousness (or more exactly, the problem >of having a theory of conscsiousness). Yes - I'm well aware of this >problem, and unlike some, I don't believe it is a non-problem.
OK. I prefer to call it the mind-body problem. That reminds us that there is both a mind problem *and* a body problem. Now I do have a theory of mind with comp: mainly given by the discourse of the self-referential sound UTMs, and its guardian angel: G and G* The body is less obvious, but translating the UDA in arithmetic, this gives Z1 and Z1* for physical experiment and experiences. Open problem are: is Z1* completely axiomatisable? Does Z1* give the entire Birkhof von Neuman quantum logic. Does Z1* "violates" Bell inequality, is there a unique representation of Z1* in term of subspaces of Hilbert space, etc. >In Occam's razor, I don't just ignore this problem, I sweep it under >the rug. At some stage I have said "Theories of Consciousness have >bogged down in a quagmire". I think I must have just said it, as I >cannot find it written in any publications. Perhaps I want to distance >myself somewhat from the mud-slinging going on. If treasures were not hidden in the mud, they would not be treasures :-) >Without providing a theory, or even a >definition of what consciousness is, in the paper I assume 3 >propositions to be true about consciousness: > >i) It is capable of universal computation (in order to interpret) >ii) It experiences time (in order to compute) >iii) It "projects" out actual events from the set of potential events. i) is ambiguous. And doubtful for most crisp interpretation I try. For exemple I believe cats are conscious. Cats are capable of universal computation only in a very large sense. Still I appreciate, but dangerous because most people will derive that animal are not conscious. ii) needs a definition of time. You will see how time emerges in my approach. It is linked to consciousness, and basicaly I would agree, although the subject of experience is a person and not consciousness, which is a qualitative state of that person experiencing time. iii) is a correct description of the appearances. > [...] >The reason I say this is that while homo sapiens is capable of >universal computation, it is not its primary modus operandi, hence I >would be surprised if the prior distribution of descriptions was given >by a universal computer. I don't see the relation with the prior distribution. I guess I miss something here. >One can criticse my work on 3 >grounds: > >i) My conclusions do not follow logically from this basis >ii) That there are additional hidden assumptions needed, that I've not made >clear or precise >iii) That one or more of the above assumptions are false >[...] >I'm am therefore, far more interested in errors of logic or >omission. It would seem that you would develop a criticism along the >lines of ii) - hidden assumptions, however I've yet to see these spelt >out (or perhaps they have, just I haven't understood it because of >language barriers). In fact I'm not sure what exactly are your assumptions. Are you talking on the assumptions about consciousness? I have still the feeling that you attach observers to universes. You don't postulate comp, do you? Bruno
