Bruno:

> We can go back to that "step 11" another time, but for now I will
> assume you agree "everything is soft, and even arithmetical (in the
> sense that the UD is naturally embedded in plato heaven arithmetics.

Yes, that's fine.

Joel:
>> Yes, this sounds reasonable. I would agree: In general, it's not
>> possible to predict one's future. Anything is possible... so nothng
>> is probable.
>>
>> But we can still *hope* for certain futures. ;-)

Bruno:
> But don't we have a contradiction, or something like an empirical
> contradiction here. I can certainly hope for certain futures, and
> honestly I think (at least from past experience) that some are more
> probable than others. For exemple I am now preparing some coffee. I
> would have the feeling of lying to myself if I was telling you that I
> do not believe "drinking" coffee is probable. So "something" is
> probable. So, if we maintain comp, we must explain why, after I have
> done coffee, drinking coffee got an higher degree of probability. We
> must aknowledge that physicalist do have an explanation here. There
> is coffee, there is a material machine preparing it, etc.

Hmm... I think I see the problem now.  But I don't understand your proposed
solution.

Do you want to 1) make predictions about the future based on past
observations, or 2) make predictions about the future based on all possible
histories, or 3) something else entirely.

In the first case (1), I think I can see how this might be possible.

For example, if every 9 out of 10 times you drink the coffee after making
it, then you should be able to reasonably conclude that the next time you
make coffee, you will most likely drink it.

Similarly, if 99 out of 100 times an electron is deflected away from the
nucleus of an atom, then we can be reasonably sure that the next time we
fire one into the nucleus, it will be deflected.

This seems to work in our current simulation because for the most part, our
world appears to be mostly "predictable".  But it will start to fail in
worlds where there is little regularity.  (e.g. making coffee and drinking
coffee almost never happen)

But in the second case (2) I can't see how we can make any meaningful
predictions since the number of all possible histories is infinite.

> Put in another way, we must derive the laws of physics from computer
> science. And, through the role of the notion of 1-pov, we must derive
> physical belief from coherent discourse by machines, or more simply
> derive physics from (machine) psychology.
>
> Do you agree?

I'm not sure.  I'm still unclear about what you are proposing.

How can we derive physics from psychology?

Can you give some simple example, like the coffee experiment?

> If you follow me perhaps you can understand why, in case your MUCA
> is *the* bottom, then we should not postulate that!!! We should prove
> it, for exemple by showing that the measure behave well only thanks
> to the infinite MUCAs' work generated in arithmetics (or by any DUs,
> or in Numberland, as I like to say.

No - sorry.  I don't understand that either.  I think you've lost me.

> If you really take the comp 1-indeterminisme seriously, perhaps you
> can guess also why our very finiteness makes us confronting some
> continuum, and some random oracle, ...

Infinite possibilities?  I don't know.

Joel


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