>> Do you realise now that not only we have a form of 1-indeterminacy 
>> but we have also a sort of 1-nonlocality.
>Yes, from the first-person point of view.  Though I would try to 
>argue that the third-person point of view must always remain local.  
>Note: If you find that remark controversial, feel free to defer that 
>discussion until later.  For now, I would just like to follow your 

Actually I agree with you: the third-person point of view must 
always remain local. I talk sometimes of 3-locality. Note that MWI
(Many World Interpretation of QM) is really the necessary move
to conserve QM and 3-locality (and 3-determinacy btw).
Experimental confirmation of the violations of Bell's inequality is
either a confirmation of our 3-non-locality or of the existence of 
parallel histories. Bell supposes implicitely that quantum 
experience have a unique outcome, but both with COMP or with SE 
(Schrodinger Eq.) we must accept the idea of the realisation 
of multiple outcomes.

>> And so do you agree that the way of quantifying 1-indeterminacy
>> is invariant if we substitute real environment by virtual one, or
>> if we mix them ...
>Yes, this is fine by me.  As I've said, I also believe our immediate 
>world IS virtual.  In fact I'm not sure there is any difference 
>between real and virtual.  In my mind, everything is real.  Or 
>everything is virtual.  It doesn't matter.  But maybe this isn't 
>the place to discuss that.  So please continue...

No need to discuss that, I still agree with you. I have introduced
the "real physical world" (a quite mythical construct) only for the
sake of the argument. In fact you have answered question 11 (and
probably more other) which are needed to explain why we don't need
to really concretely run the UD. Like most people in this list
it seems you have no problem with that so I skip those questions.
We can go back to that "step 11" another time, but for now I will
assume you agree "everything is soft, and even arithmetical (in
the sense that the UD is naturally embedded in plato heaven

>> Do you agree that, in that case, for any experience/experiment 
>> you intend to do, here and now, to predict your immediate 
>> personal futur (this includes the result you see when observing 
>> the needle), you must take into account (i.e. the domain of 
>> 1-indeterminacy is given by) all the virtual reconstitutions (and 
>> the computational stories going through it) of yourself generated 
>> by the UD?
>Yes, this sounds reasonable.  I would agree: In general, it's not 
>possible to predict one's future.  Anything is possible... so 
>nothng is probable.
>But we can still *hope* for certain futures. ;-)

But don't we have a contradiction, or something like an empirical
contradiction here. I can certainly hope for certain futures, and
honestly I think (at least from past experience) that some are
more probable than others. For exemple I am now preparing some
coffee. I would have the feeling of lying to myself if I was 
telling you that I do not believe "drinking" coffee is probable.
So "something" is probable. So, if we maintain comp, we must
explain why, after I have done coffee, drinking coffee got an
higher degree of probability. We must aknowledge that physicalist
do have an explanation here. There is coffee, there is a material
machine preparing it, etc. 

For the computationalist that simple explanation is not available.
For an explanation that "preparing coffee" augment the degree of
plausibility  (probability, credibility) of the experience of 
drinking coffee, the only way is to isolate, from pure arithmetics,
a measure on the consistent computational extensions of my preparing 
coffee-state-history and to show that in most of them (in a sense
which need to be define also purely arithmeticaly) I will be
drinking coffee. Slurp. (I'm definitely drinking coffee now!).

Put in another way, we must derive the laws of physics from
computer science. And, through the role of the notion of 1-pov,
we must derive physical belief from coherent discourse by machines,
or more simply derive physics from (machine) psychology.

Do you agree?

(Actually I have pave the way for doing that derivation of physics
and I've got some (technical) result which I have explain to George
in this list, except that I still must answer some question. 
The basic idea is to substitute the grandmother psychology by the 
Godel-Lob logic of provability. You can look in the archive,
but it is rather technical).

If you follow me perhaps you can understand why, in case your
MUCA is *the* bottom, then we should not postulate that!!!
We should prove it, for exemple by showing that the measure
behave well only thanks to the infinite MUCAs' work generated
in arithmetics (or by any DUs, or in Numberland, as I like to 

If you really take the comp 1-indeterminisme seriously, perhaps
you can guess also why our very finiteness makes us confronting
some continuum, and some random oracle, ...


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