Hal Ruhl wrote:

>>In what sense "4+1=" is a proof chain ? A proof must be a sequence of
>>formula each of which are either axiom instance or theorems.
>IMO it is ...

Definitions are not matter of opinion, but of conventional consensus. 

>   ... a sequence of:

>1) A formula which in this case is of the form ("data string" + ), it is a 
>rule of inference acting on a initializing theorem.

"data string " +  can hardly be considered as a formula. You should 
the formal system you are using (if any ?). 
Then you tell us it is a rule of inference as if it was possible for a 
formula to *be* a rule of inference. I don't understand.

>2) The initializing theorem is "data string".  Let us ignore the fact that 
>the strings above are so short as to be individual alphabet elements.

Not an a priori problem, but not very helpful without a presentation of 
formal system.

>The next step in the sequence is the axiom "1".

"1" is not an axiom. It is a symbol denoting the number 1. It is neither 
an axiom, nor a formula. 

>The value of this formula is designated by "=".

 I see what you mean. This will not help us.

>>If you interpret the theorem "4+1=5" as 5 is a number, how will you
>>interpret 3+2=5 ?
>It is another proof the theorem  "string "5" is a number or WFF"  [ Again 
>ignoring that this string is so short as to be a single alphabet 
>element.]  There can be more than one proof of a theorem.

Of course you can build a FAS such that the number will be considered as 
theorem. But then it is a very ad hoc special fas which has nothing
to do with number theory, and Juergen's remark remains valid.

In another post Hal Ruhl wrote:

>Ok so "computation" is more than "prove" but prove is computation is that 
>the idea?

If you consider an axiomatisable theory, you can  consider
proof as a (partial) computable function defined on a set of
sentences and with value in {0,1}. If the theory is decidable then
the function is total.
Even a theory as weak as Robinson Arithmetic can be use to 
compute all partial recursive function (programmable function): in
that sense "proving" is more than computation. 
Well, you can compare proof and computation in a lot of manner, and
depending of the criteria you choose, proof or computation will
be more or less than computation or proof.

A good book is "Introduction to Mathematical Logic" by Eliott
Mendelson (third edition), Wadsworth & Brooks, California, 1987.

>Here it is in one line:
>                  ....N - N   ->  S;  S +  N   ->   N;   N - N   ->   S....
>N is the Nothing and S is the Superverse.
>All information = no information
>N is no information.
>N - N is the smallest possible computable perturbation brought on by a need 
>of N to test its own stability.
>S is all information absent the N.  It is as close to the N as can be.
>S also needs to respond to the stability question via test because it 
>contains almost all information which is almost no information.  Like the 
>UD it can not prove anything it just generates stuff.  The smallest 
>perturbation is to add back the N which results in all information and S 
>becomes N.  Both events destroy history.
>It is your scanner-duplicator acting at the lowest level.
>My difference is that when S is manifest it is not a UD but is like a vast 
>collection of individual computers running in parallel.  A great "dove 
>tailed" structure.  Each is isomorphic to a universe.
>I also introduce two additional arguments re each computer as to why 
>determinism does not apply.  1) Deterministic cascades hit a complexity 
>wall,  2) The random oracle is in S anyway - it gets used or it is a 
>selection - it would be information unused by an exception.  These plus the 
>lowest level scanner-duplicator mean there is some degree of random oracle 
>present in each one including those that have SAS or attempt deterministic 
>cascades.  There is an even distribution of universes since each computer 
>is present an infinite number of times again to avoid any absolute or 
>relative information in S.
>Since N and S can not prove anything it is good that they can nevertheless 
>compute the respective perturbations that run the scanner-duplicator 

I"m willing to believe you try to say something, but
I don't understand a bit. I'm sorry.

>After looking at all of your recent posts re my questions I conclude that 
>my Superverse idea and your UDA idea are cousins.  See also my just 
>previous post re "Some progress I think".

The UDA is used to prove something, mainly that physics is 
ultimately a branch of machine psychology.

>My argument carries a rationale for a lowest level repeating 
>scanner-duplicator type of behavior [i.e. stability], my Superverse is 
>generated immediately and repeatedly at one end of that behavior,  the 
>Superverse acts as "data food" for all my parallel computers which are 
>actually comparators orchestrating isomorphic link shifts between all the 
>patterns in the Superverse [link shifts = evolving universes], and it takes 
>no selected information to construct all these computers since they are 
>self contained in each link but such information though small seems 
>necessary to construct the UD.



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