Um, OK, I don't want to get into an infinite argument here. I guess we both understand 
the other's viewpoint. (For the record: I
don't see any reason to accept QTI as correct, but think that *if* it is, it would fit 
in with the available (subjective)
observational evidence - that being the point on which we differ. I also think that 
for QTI to be correct, a number of other things
would have to hold - space-time would have to be quantised, objects in the same 
quantum state would have to be literally identical
(no matter where they happened to be in the uni/multiverse) . . . and, either the 
multiverse has to exist, or our universe has to be
infinite . . . and probably a few other points I can't think of right now!)


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Tuesday, 4 September 2001 1:12 p.m.
> Subject: RE: FIN too
> >From: "Charles Goodwin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >[Jacques Mallah wrote]
> > >     But there's one exception: your brain can only hold a
> limited amount
> >of information.  So it's possible to be too old to remember
> how old you
> >are.  *Only if you are that old, do you have a right to not
> reject FIN on
> >these grounds.*  Are you that old?
> >
> >Yeah, that's one of my objections to QTI. Although perhaps
> add-on memory
> >chips will become available one day :-)
>     OK.  (And even if the chips become available, you'd
> probably only be
> able to add a finite # before collapsing into a black hole.)
> > >     Right.  Do you think you are in an infinitesimal
> > > fraction, or in a typical fraction?
> >
> >Infinitesimal, if QTI is correct, otherwise fairly typical.
> Assuming QTI is
> >correct and ignoring any other objections to it, it's
> *possible* for me to
> >be in an infinitesimal fraction - in fact it's necessary.
>     Right - which is why Bayesian reasoning falsifies FIN,
> but only with
> 100% reliability as opposed to complete reliability.
> >but according to QTI I *must* pass through a phase when I
> see the unlikely
> >bits, no matter how unlikely it is that a typical moment
> will fall into
> >that phase. Even if I later spend 99.9999999999999999999....% of my
> >observer moments seeing the stars going out one by one,
> there still has to
> >be that starting point!
>     Right, again, that's why the reliability is just 100%.
> >My (ahem) point is, though, that none of us ARE at a typical
> point (again,
> >assuming QTI). In fact we're in a very atypical point, just
> as the "era of
> >stars" might be a very atypical point in the history of the
> universe - but
> >it's a point we (or the universe) HAVE TO PASS THROUGH to reach more
> >typical points (e.g. very old, no stars left...). Hence it's
> consistent
> >with QTI that we find ourselves passing through this point...
>     Right, consistent with it but only 0% of the time, hence
> the Bayesian
> argument is to put 0 credence in the FIN rather than strictly
> no credence.
> >I'm not arguing for QTI here, but I do think that you can't
> argue from
> >finding yourself at a particular point on your world-line to that
> >world-line having finite length, because you are guaranteed to find
> >yourself at that particular point at some (ah) point.
>     Right, which is why I'm (now) careful not to make *that*
> argument by
> arbritarily using one's current age to base a reference point
> on.  (e.g. in
> my reply to Bruno.)  Rather, I argue that from being at a
> point prior to
> some _natural reference point_ such as the "can calculate my
> age" crierion,
> one can conclude that one's world-line is finite.
> >So I'm rejecting, not Bayesian logic per se, but the
> application of it to
> >what (according to QTI) would be a very special (but still
> allowable) case.
>     There are no grounds to reject it in this case, since it would be
> reliable almost all of the time.  There's no difference
> between using a
> method because it works for most people vs. using a method
> because it works
> for me most of the time.  At any given time, it works for
> most people, too.
> >The basic problem is that we experience observer moments as
> a sequence.
> >Hence we *must* experience the earlier moments before the
> later ones, and
> >if we happen to come across QTI before we reach "QTI-like"
> observer moments
> >then we might reject it for lack of (subjective) evidence.
> But that doesn't
> >contradict QTI, which predicts that we have to pass through
> these earlier
> >moments, and that we will observe everyone else doing so as well.
> >I wish I could put that more clearly, or think of a decent
> analogy, but do
> >you see what I mean? Our observations aren't actually
> *incompatible* with
> >QTI, even if they do only cover an infinitsimal chunk of our
> total observer
> >moments.
>     Indeed so, I know only too well what you mean.  This has
> come up more
> than once on the list.
>     I hope you understand why I say it's irrelevant.  _Just
> like_ in the A/B
> case, it would be wrong to not use Bayesian reasoning just
> because seeing A
> is, yes, compatible with both #1 and #2.  Seeing A could even
> have been a
> way to confirm theory #2, if the rival theory #1 hadn't
> existed.  The bottom
> line is that Bayesian reasoning usually works for most people.
>                          - - - - - - -
>                Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
>          Physicist  /  Many Worlder  /  Devil's Advocate
> "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
>          My URL:
> _________________________________________________________________
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